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Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise (MSME) Insolvency in Canada
March 30, 2016
Janis Sarra1
INTRODUCTION
Insolvency law is broadly recognized as an essential tool in well-functioning economies.2 A balance of
mechanisms that allow for timely and effective liquidation, but also for a “fresh start” for individual
entrepreneurs and the rehabilitation of viable businesses, tends to enhance creditor recoveries and lender
confidence.3 Credible restructuring schemes can ensure that viable businesses with a going-forward
business plan can survive, in turn preserving jobs, supply contracts, customer goodwill, and contributing
more generally to economic stability.4 Globally, concern has been expressed that while insolvency systems
are evolving, there continue to be barriers to effective restructuring for micro, small and medium
enterprises (“MSME”). To that end, the World Bank will soon convene a task force to examine these
issues.5 Insolvency law is broadly recognized as an essential tool in well-functioning economies.6 In
Canada, it is generally acknowledged that the insolvency system works relatively well, particularly for
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The Financial Stability Board, which monitors the global financial system, recognizes “Insolvency and Creditor Rights” as one
of fourteen policy domains “designated as key for sound financial systems”, in which internationally recognized best practice
standards are considered as “deserving of priority implementation depending on country circumstances.” Financial Stability
Board, Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems; www.fsb.org/what-we-do/about-the-compendium-ofstandards/key_standards.
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European Commission, “Declaring your enterprise to be an SME”, Commission communication — Model declaration on the
information relating to the qualification of an enterprise as an SME, Official Journal C 118 , 20/05/2003 P. 0005 – 0015,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52003XC0520(02).
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consumer debtors and large enterprises,7 but there is some question as to whether the system adequately
serves MSME.
This study was undertaken for Industry Canada Marketplace Policy Branch as the Canadian Government
looks to the next round of possible legislative reform.8 The study undertook a qualitative empirical
examination of MSME filings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA),9 and undertook a survey of
53 licenced insolvency professionals and ten distressed loans officers, in order to understand the
challenges that face Canadian MSME as they slide into financial distress. What is clear from the data that
were obtained is that while the current system is fairly well-functioning on the “personal fresh start”
aspects of MSME insolvency, it has significant barriers, both in terms of cost and administration, such that
liquidations are occurring and value and employment is being lost where there is business potential going
forward.
The study concluded that it is timely to undertake some amendments to the BIA to address MSME
insolvency. In particular, I suggest that there is need for a streamlined approach to bankruptcy of micro
and small businesses (“MSE”), so that MSE can access formal proceedings. Such a process would counter
the current trend of secured creditors simply realizing on their assets without regard to other creditors’
interests. The streamlined approach should be administratively simpler and eliminate the need for
repeated court appearances, unless creditors object. The MSE proposal process could include the
following elements. The federal government should consider empowering the licensed insolvency trustee
to extend the initial stay for a limited period, if notice has been given to creditors and there is no objection.
Any objections would be dealt with by the court. I also suggest that the streamlined proposal process
should be available to sole proprietors, whether or not incorporated, micro and small businesses.
Consideration should be given to extending the streamlined process to medium enterprises, and if so, to
the conditions under which such a streamlined process would be available.
Access to a MSE proposal process could be defined by a combination of numbers of employees and a cap
of liabilities, the latter being much higher than the current limit under Division II of the BIA. Authority
should be vested in the trustee to undertake specified tasks in order to facilitate agreement between the
debtor and creditors of proposals, eliminating the requirement to seek supplemental orders from the
court on appointment.
There should be an ability to make a proposal to creditors without the need to hold a meeting of creditors,
unless a specified percentage of creditors, such as 25%, request it. Proposals in a streamlined process
should provide for at least the liquidation value of creditors’ claims in the proposal. If, after a specified
period, creditors have expressed support for the proposal in terms of a specified number of creditors
holding a specified percentage of the debt, the proposal should be deemed approved, without having to
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The recent trend of primarily liquidations for larger enterprises is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this article, but merits
study.
8 Specifically, the Marketplace Policy Branch of Industry Canada requested that the report: Examine access to and utilization by
Canadian small and medium enterprises of the formal insolvency process, including trying to ascertain the reasons for the
decline in filings; undertake a qualitative study of data from the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (“OSB”) on the
reasons for SME insolvency and types of debt; survey a representative sample of trustees and five to ten loan officers, to
identify the perceived barriers to accessing and utilizing BIA proceedings; generate policy questions and considerations on the
issue of SME insolvency proceedings.
9 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3, as amended, Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité, LRC 1985, c B-3, en sa version
modifiée.
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seek court approval. Any objections would still be dealt with by the court. The government could consider
making the threshold for deemed approval of a MSE proposal a simple majority of creditors in both
number and value of the claims. There should be time limits placed on Canada Revenue Agency’s time to
respond to the proposed proposal, after which it is deemed to have approved the proposal.
I suggest that the BIA proposal process should still be subject to a six-month limit in the normal case, but
the court should be authorized to extend the six-month limit for all types of proposals under the BIA in
circumstances that the court considers appropriate. There should be a streamlined process to cure a
temporary default in the terms of a MSE proposal, including deeming it cured where creditors receive
notice and do not object. For all filings, there is a need to modernize the notice provisions under the BIA,
including allowing for electronic notice; and to modernize voting processes under the BIA, including the
use of new technologies to allow for electronic voting by creditors. There is also need for the creation of
a simplified standard form claims process that can be expedited where there is no dispute in the amounts
owed to creditors.
Whether or not the government decides to create a streamlined process, it should consider raising the
current cap on liabilities for access to Division II BIA proposals or exempting equipment used in trade or
professional practice from the cap, so that individuals with a higher level of debt are not forced into the
administratively costly Division I proposal process. The government should also consider expanding the
current “tools of the trade” exemption to incorporated sole proprietorships and micro businesses. An
innovative idea that was raised during the survey was that the government should consider raising the
exemption amount to file GST/HST to 50,000 CAD or 60,000 CAD from the current 30,000 CAD that has
been in place since the 1980s. Such a move would reduce both administrative and cost burdens on MSE.
Finally, there is an urgent need for funding and availability of education and skills building for individuals
commencing new businesses. Modest amounts allocated to counselling for individual debtors after
insolvency or bankruptcy fails to acknowledge that there is need for early intervention, perhaps at the
time the business is being registered, to provide basic skills training on managing finances and
understanding early financial risks to the new business.
In summary, as this study highlights, there needs to be a mechanism that allows for a more streamlined
and accessible process to deal with the financial distress of micro and small businesses without the loss
of safeguards for creditors, including employees. Moreover, it is important to note that this study did not
canvass the views of any other stakeholder groups, such as trade unions, pensioner groups and trade
suppliers, and the legislative reform process should engage with a much broader community regarding a
range of possible options for legislative reform of the treatment of MSME insolvency.
A brief explanation of what the Marketplace Policy Branch of Industry Canada commissioned. It requested
that the report:
 Examine access to and utilization by Canadian small and medium enterprises of the formal insolvency
process, including trying to ascertain the reasons for the decline in filings.
 Undertake a qualitative study of data from the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (“OSB”)
on the reasons for SME insolvency and types of debt.
 Survey a representative sample of 30 to 50 bankruptcy trustees and five to ten loan officers, to
identify the perceived barriers to accessing and utilizing BIA proceedings.
 Generate policy questions and considerations on the issue of SME insolvency proceedings.
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The report has four parts. First, it introduces some of the challenges facing MSME within the existing
legislative framework, briefly examining the Canadian system and the framework in the United States and
United Kingdom. Part II then undertakes a qualitative examination of the filings of a sample of 200
corporate insolvencies in 2015, in order to try to understand the reasons for insolvency, types of debt,
and outcomes of proposals. Part III examines the results of a survey of 53 licensed insolvency trustees
and ten loan officers across Canada, in terms of their professional advice and experience with respect to
the barriers to small and medium enterprise insolvency proceedings. Finally, Part IV makes some
suggestions regarding possible amendments to the insolvency framework that are deserving of public
policy discussion and consideration going forward.

I.

MICRO, SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISE INSOLVENCY
1. Overview

Micro, small and medium businesses are very important to the Canadian economy, as a major source of
jobs, development of new technologies and economic growth. As of 2012, small businesses employed 7.7
million employees in Canada, comprising 69.7% of the total private sector labour force.10 In the decade
leading to 2012, small businesses created more than 100,000 jobs on average annually, accounting for
almost 78% of all private jobs created in that period.11 Industry Canada has also reported that 98% of the
1.08 million small businesses in Canada in 2013 had 1 to 99 employees.12 At the same time, small
businesses also frequently fail in the marketplace, particularly micro businesses;13 so timely access to the
insolvency process is an essential part of the regulatory framework.
Small businesses usually need to secure loans with the personal assets or personal guarantees of the
principals, blurring distinctions between personal and business liability. This convergence of personal and
business debt means that debtors may have access to effective liquidation or rehabilitation schemes only
if they fit within very specific criteria. In Canada, there is a highly streamlined mechanism for micro
businesses to use Division II “consumer” proposal provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA),
which are accessible to non-incorporated self-employed individuals and sole proprietors whose debts are
less than 250,000 CAD, excluding a mortgage or hypothec on the individual’s principal residence.14 But
this mechanism is not available where the individual has incorporated the business; and the existing
process for rehabilitation under the BIA can be prohibitively expensive for micro and small businesses.
Any legislative reform must balance facilitating rescue of viable enterprises with a timely and effective
mechanism for the MSME to be liquidated, giving their principals a chance for a fresh start.
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Industry Canada, Key Small Business Statistics August 2013, at 8; www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/061.nsf/vwapj/KSBS-PSRPE_AugustAout2013_eng.pdf/$FILE/KSBS-PSRPE_August-Aout2013_eng.pdf, most current available to December 2015.
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Ibid at 10.
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Industry Canada, Key Small Business Statistics, supra note 10.
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For statistics in 2008-2009, see ibid at 14.
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Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c. B-3, as amended (BIA). Consumer debtor is defined in Division II, s. 66.11 of the
BIA as: ““consumer debtor” means an individual who is bankrupt or insolvent and whose aggregate debts, excluding any
debts secured by the individual’s principal residence, are not more than $250,000 or any other prescribed amount”.
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There are numerous ways to define small and medium enterprises (“SME”): annual gross or net revenue,
value of assets and/or liabilities, value of sales, legal structure, or number of employees, to name a few.15
Industry Canada defines small business as employing 5 to 99 employees.16 It defines medium enterprises
as employing over those numbers and up to 499 employees.17 I use those definitions for purposes of the
discussion here. That would leave “micro” businesses to be defined as 1 to 4 employees. In contrast, the
OSB, another federal government department, defines businesses differently for purposes of reporting
statistics relating to Canada’s insolvency legislation. A business is “any commercial entity or organization
other than an individual, or an individual who has incurred 50 percent or more of total liabilities as a result
of operating a business.”18 Hence an individual consumer debtor is characterized as a business for
purposes of the BIA where his or her business debts comprise 50% of total debts. These definitions do
not align with the BIA, which does not expressly use the language of size of enterprise, but rather, defines
persons, insolvent persons, debtors, consumer debtors, and corporations for purposes of the legislation.19
Access to particular mechanisms under the statute are based on personal identity and size of debt. It
merits note that the lack of alignment of definitions between the OSB and Industry Canada has resulted
in some problems with data analysis.
A definitional issue in respect of thinking about micro businesses is that of sole proprietorship. Many
jurisdictions define “business” as having at least one employee on the payroll.20 Many small businesses
are sole proprietorships, and some are incorporated and some are not. Usually incorporation of the micro
business occurs because someone has advised the individual business person that he or she will better
protect his or her personal assets if the business is incorporated. While, generally, that is true in terms of
protection from personal liability for tort claims against the incorporated entity, contract counter-party
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For a discussion, see Ronald Davis, Stephan Madaus, Alberto Mazzoni, Irit Mevorach, Riz Mokal, Barbara Romaine, Janis
Sarra, and Ignacio Tirado, The Modular Approach to MSME Insolvency (January 2016 partial draft, on file with author).
16

Market Framework Policy Branch, Industry Canada, 2015. In the service industry, it defines small as employing 5 to 49
employees.
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Ibid.

18

OSB, Insolvency Statistics in Canada—August 2015, www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br03457.html#tbl3. Consumer
insolvency is defined as an individual for whom 50 percent or more of total liabilities relate to consumer goods and services.
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The definitions, except for that of consumer debtor contained in footnote 9 above, are contained in s. 2 of the BIA.
“Insolvent person” is defined as “a person who is not bankrupt and who resides, carries on business or has property in
Canada, whose liabilities to creditors provable as claims under this Act amount to one thousand dollars, and (a) who is for
any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due, (b) who has ceased paying his current obligations
in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due, or (c) the aggregate of whose property is not, at a fair
valuation, sufficient, or, if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable
payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due”; “person” is defined as: ““person” includes a partnership, an
unincorporated association, a corporation, a cooperative society or a cooperative organization, the successors of a
partnership, of an association, of a corporation, of a society or of an organization and the heirs, executors, liquidators of the
succession, administrators or other legal representatives of a person”; “debtor” is defined as: ““debtor” includes an
insolvent person and any person who, at the time an act of bankruptcy was committed by him, resided or carried on
business in Canada and, where the context requires, includes a bankrupt”; “bankrupt” is defined as “a person who has
made an assignment or against whom a bankruptcy order has been made or the legal status of that person”; and
“corporation” “means a company or legal person that is incorporated by or under an Act of Parliament or of the legislature
of a province, an incorporated company, wherever incorporated, that is authorized to carry on business in Canada or has an
office or property in Canada or an income trust, but does not include banks, authorized foreign banks within the meaning of
section 2 of the Bank Act, insurance companies, trust companies, loan companies or railway companies.”
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See for example, Industry Canada, Key Small Business Statistics, supra note 10 at 7.
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claims, etc., the reality is that micro and small businesses (“MSE”) cannot get financing for their business
unless they can guarantee the debt with their personal assets.21 Such guarantees effectively blur the
distinction between personal and business debt. Industry Canada’s definition of “business” is one that has
at least one employee on the payroll, submitting deductions to Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) for such
employees.22 It does not count, as part of its small business statistics, sole proprietorships that do not
employ anyone or that employ people as contractors or contract employees.23
Bankruptcy liquidation is the most prevalent outcome of MSME insolvency in Canada, which in many cases
is the most effective resolution to the financial distress. However, in other cases, liquidation can result in
loss of value to creditors and debtors. Reasons for MSME financial distress can include a lack of
management skills or corporate governance mechanisms to deal with business viability and downturns in
the market, which, in turn, can result in untimely filing of insolvency proceedings, failure to prevent
further downward spiralling of finances, failure to deal with operational and financial failures, and a lack
of resources to hire effective expertise to deal with the insolvency.24
There has been a continuing decline in business filings under the BIA for the past decade. In 2014, the
insolvency rate of businesses commencing proceedings pursuant to the BIA were 1.4 per 1,000 businesses,
down from 4.8 per 1,000 ten years prior.25 As will be discussed in Part III, trustees and loan officers
attribute this decline largely to the costly administrative burden for addressing MSME insolvency under
the BIA.
Industry Canada reports that survival rates for small and medium-sized businesses in Canada decline over
time.26 For example, approximately 85% of businesses that enter the marketplace survive for one full year,
only 70% survive for two years, and only 51% survive for five years. On average, from 2002 to 2008, about
99,000 new small businesses were created in Canada each year; the number of exits annually was
approximately 86,000 from 2002 to 2004; and then rose to 95,000 in 2008.27

2. Treatment of MSME Insolvency in Canada
The BIA provides a mechanism for bankruptcy of businesses. An insolvent debtor can make an assignment
in bankruptcy or a creditor or group of creditors can make an application for a bankruptcy order in respect
of a debtor, in order to have a licensed insolvency trustee appointed to liquidate the debtor’s assets for
the benefit of the creditors. For individuals, bankruptcy offers an opportunity for a fresh start financially.

21

Davis et al, supra note 10.
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Industry Canada, supra note 15.

23

Ibid at 5.

24

Davis et al, supra note 10.

25

Industry Canada, “Annual Business Insolvency Rates by Province and Economic Region”, www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsfosb.nsf/eng/br01821.html.

26

Industry Canada, Key Small Business Statistics, supra note 10, defined as enterprises with less than 250 employees for
purposes of this statistic.

27

Ibid at 12.
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For incorporated businesses, bankruptcy usually entails winding-up the company and liquidating all the
assets, in order to pay out creditors based on the hierarchy of claims set out in the statute. In this respect,
bankruptcy proceedings are an effective means of realizing on valuable assets, such as accounts
receivable, for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate, and ensuring an expeditious and fair distribution of
the proceeds. Sometimes the corporate shell is preserved if there is value to its continuation, although it
appears not often for micro and small enterprises. Sometimes the bankruptcy involves a going-concern
sale of all or part of the business, aimed at preserving value of the business, jobs and customer goodwill.
Most often, however, the bankruptcy proceeding means the end of the incorporated business. The BIA
also provides a series of interim mechanisms such as appointment of receivers or interim receivers to take
conservatory and other measures for the protection of assets that creditors can lay claim to because of
the firm’s financial distress. The process is administrative, rather than largely court-based, as it is in some
other jurisdictions.
For individuals, including business sole proprietors, automatic discharge is available for first-time
bankrupts after they make an assignment or are ordered into bankruptcy, either in nine months or 21
months, depending on whether the bankrupt has surplus income, unless it is opposed by a creditor, the
trustee, or the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.28 Automatic discharge is available for second-time
bankrupts, either in 24 months or in 36 months after the date of bankruptcy, depending on whether the
bankrupt has surplus income, unless, in that period, an opposition to the discharge has been filed.29 This
“fresh start” is a positive aspect of the bankruptcy provisions, allowing, in some cases, the sole proprietor
to salvage his or her business activity, retain customers and a quantity of tools used in performance of the
business. The wind-up of an incorporated business, particularly small or micro business, can also result in
a type of fresh start for the individuals that are principals of the entity, as they can move their employment
activities elsewhere. However, because of personal guarantees and potential director liabilities, in many
cases, the director may also have to file for personal bankruptcy, creating double the process and costs.30
In addition to its liquidation and debt collection mechanism, the BIA provides a scheme for proposals, in
order to allow an insolvent business an opportunity to restructure its affairs to become financially viable.31
A proposal can include a “proposal for a composition”, where creditors agree to accept less than full
repayment or agree to an extension of time; and/or a scheme of arrangement in terms of alteration of

28

Section 168.1, BIA. The provisions specify: 168.1 (1) Automatic discharge —Subject to subsections (2) and 157.1(3), the
following provisions apply in respect of an individual bankrupt other than a bankrupt referred to in subsection 172.1(1): (a)
in the case of a bankrupt who has never before been bankrupt under the laws of Canada or of any prescribed jurisdiction, the
bankrupt is automatically discharged (i) on the expiry of 9 months after the date of bankruptcy unless, in that 9 month period,
an opposition to the discharge has been filed or the bankrupt has been required to make payments under section 68 to the
estate of the bankrupt, or (ii) on the expiry of 21 months after the date of bankruptcy unless an opposition to the discharge
has been filed before the automatic discharge takes effect; and (b) in the case of a bankrupt who has been a bankrupt one
time before under the laws of Canada or of any prescribed jurisdiction, the bankrupt is automatically discharged (i) on the
expiry of 24 months after the date of bankruptcy unless, in that 24 month period, an opposition to the discharge has been
filed or the bankrupt has been required to make payments under section 68 to the estate of the bankrupt, or (ii) on the expiry
of 36 months after the date of bankruptcy unless an opposition to the discharge has been filed before the automatic discharge
takes effect.

29

Ibid.

30
31

Davis et al, supra note 10.
Proposal provisions are found in Part III of the BIA. All insolvent debtors can access the proposal provisions in Division I of
Part III, but only consumer debtors (insolvent natural persons whose debt load is within a specified threshold) have access to
the proposal provisions in Division II of Part III.
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debt and equity structure. The premise is that by reducing the amount of debt, renegotiating payment
terms or terminating costly contracts, the business can turn around its financial affairs and become viable
again.
Proposals can be made under the Division I proposal provisions of the BIA, or, in some circumstances,
under the Division II consumer proposal provisions.32 Division I proposals are available for insolvent
individuals and incorporated businesses. The mechanism is frequently used where the debts are more
than 250,000 CAD, or the business is incorporated and thus Division II is not available. The Division I
proposal provisions are highly codified, and there is supervision by a licensed insolvency trustee, creating
some certainty and predictability for both debtors and creditors. The proposal process can, in many
instances, offer a timely means of devising a workout plan for the financially troubled business. The
process is generally timelier and less expensive than proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors
Arrangement Act (CCAA).33 The six month maximum period for such proceedings gives creditors some
certainty that a proposal will be devised within that fixed period or the debtor will become automatically
bankrupt.
Often the debtor needs time to prepare a proposal and the legislation allows the debtor, under the
Division I proposal provisions, to file a “notice of intention to make a proposal”, affording the debtor a
period to devise a viable going-forward business strategy. On filing either a proposal or a notice of
intention to make a proposal, there is an initial automatic stay of 30 days on creditors moving to enforce
their claims. The stay lasts while the proceedings are continuing. During the notice of intention period,
the court has the authority to extend the stay for periods up to 45 days to a maximum of six months in
aggregate (including the initial 30 day period). The proposal trustee has a wide discretion to assist the
debtor in developing a proposal, including assessing the debtor’s ability to make a proposal, assisting the
debtor with mandatory filing requirements and consulting creditors. Corporate officers or the sole
proprietor debtor retain control of the business assets and operations during the proposal process; and
the trustee that assists with development of the proposal acts in a monitoring and advisory capacity, as
opposed to taking over control of the enterprise or assets. The BIA proposal proceedings are used for
individuals and for all sizes of business, from sole proprietorships, to partnerships, to corporations of
various sizes.34 The mandatory stay affords the debtor “breathing space”, in the sense that creditors
cannot move to realize on their claims during this period; but the debtor must file a projected cash flow
statement with prescribed representations with a trustee and the trustee must report on the
reasonableness of the statement.
Under Division I of Part III of the BIA, when the debtor has a proposal to present to creditors, a meeting is
called, which allows creditors to vote on the proposed plan. If creditors approve the proposal by two-

32

Sections 66.11-66.4, BIA. Essentially, a Division II proposal is available where the debtor is an individual and his or her debts,
excluding the mortgage or hypothec on his or her personal residence, are less than 250,000 CAD. The relatively low threshold
of 250,000 CAD makes it difficult to capture individuals whose business may have failed, and for which the process under
Division I of Part III of the BIA may be too onerous. There could be some distinctions regarding joint consumer proposals,
where the debt load, based on the OSB’s interpretation, could end up being higher.

33

Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36, as amended (CCAA).

34

A proposal is defined in s 2 of the BIA as: ““proposal” means (a) in any provision of Division I of Part III, a proposal made under
that Division, and (b) in any other provision, a proposal made under Division I of Part III or a consumer proposal made under
Division II of Part III and includes a proposal or consumer proposal, as the case may be, for a composition, for an extension of
time or for a scheme or arrangement; (“proposition concordataire” ou “proposition”)”.
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thirds in dollar value of voting claims and majority in number of creditors, the proposal is brought to the
court for approval. The court assesses the fairness and reasonableness of the proposal and whether it
meets the statutory requirements, and then decides to approve the proposal or not. Generally, if the
proposal meets the statutory requirements, has garnered the requisite creditor support, and the trustee,
creditors or the OSB are not opposing it, the court will approve it.
The BIA sets out specific requirements of the proposal, in terms of the priority of claims that must be
observed in completing the proposal, the fees and expenses of the trustee, specified Crown claims, and
specified amounts owing to employees and pension plans where the debtor is a business. Since Division I
does not require mandatory counselling of the debtor, the proposal may or may not address the heart of
the problems that caused the financial distress. An advantage of Division I proposals is that they can
include disclaimer of leases and contracts;35 and the statute makes express provision for interim financing
for the business on a going-forward basis.36
If the creditors do not support the proposal in the requisite numbers and value, it results in a deemed
assignment in bankruptcy, creating a streamlined mechanism that does not require an order of the court.
If the court refuses to approve the proposal, there is a deemed assignment in bankruptcy.37
If there is a default in the performance of any provision of the proposal, the court has the authority to
annul a proposal. It can also annul the proposal where it is subsequently discovered that the court’s
approval was obtained by fraud, or where it appears that the debtor cannot continue the proposal without
injustice or undue delay.
The consumer proposal provisions of Division II of Part III of the BIA38 allow a much more streamlined
summary process. They are available to insolvent individuals whose debts are less than 250,000 CAD,
excluding a mortgage or hypothec on the individual’s principal residence. The provisions were enacted as
a mechanism to deal with smaller estates on a more cost-effective and expedited basis. A Division II
proposal must be made to creditors generally, but is not binding on secured creditors that have not filed
a proof of claim. Division II proposals were designed as consumer proposals; however, they are available
to self-employed individuals and sole proprietors that fall within the criteria mentioned above.

35

Section 65.11 and 65.2, BIA.

36

Section 50.6, BIA. The reality is that interim financing is not accessed very often because of the difficulty and cost in finding
interim financing, the fact that the usual lenders do not want to prime each other, and the fact that the proposal would likely
be doomed if the sole secured creditor is strongly against it.

37

Section 61(2), BIA specifies: (2) Non-approval of proposal by court —Where the court refuses to approve a proposal in respect
of an insolvent person a copy of which has been filed under section 62, (a) the insolvent person is deemed to have thereupon
made an assignment; (b) the trustee shall, without delay, file with the official receiver, in the prescribed form, a report of the
deemed assignment; (b.1) the official receiver shall issue a certificate of assignment, in the prescribed form, which has the
same effect for the purposes of this Act as an assignment filed under section 49; and (c) the trustee shall, within five days
after the day the certificate mentioned in paragraph (b) is issued, send notice of the meeting of creditors under section 102,
at which meeting the creditors may by ordinary resolution, notwithstanding section 14, affirm the appointment of the trustee
or appoint another licensed trustee in lieu of that trustee.

38

See sections 66.11 to 66.4, BIA.
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Division II proposal proceedings are commenced by the debtor obtaining the assistance of an
administrator39 in preparing the proposal and providing the administrator with the prescribed information
on the debtor's current financial situation. The duties of the administrator are set out in the statute. The
administrator investigates the debtor's property and financial affairs in order to assess with reasonable
accuracy the debtor's financial situation and the cause of insolvency. The administrator provides
counselling in accordance with directives issued by the OSB; prepares a proposal; and files a copy of the
proposal, signed by the debtor, with the official receiver. Within ten days following, the administrator
prepares and files with the official receiver a report on the results of the investigation; the administrator's
opinion as to whether the proposal is reasonable and fair to the debtor and his or her creditors and
whether the debtor will be able to perform the proposal; a condensed statement of the debtor's assets,
liabilities, income and expenses; and a list of the creditors whose claims exceed 250 CAD.40 A Division II
proposal must provide for the payment of preferred claims; and for the payment of all prescribed fees
and expenses of the administrator related to the proposal proceedings and of any person providing
counselling. The proposal must also set out the manner of distributing dividends. A proposal typically
takes three to five years to complete the payment schedule, but must be completed within five years.41
Division II proposals are streamlined because of some of their “deemed approved” features. The
administrator sends a copy of the proposal and the report to creditors, along with a claims form and a
statement explaining that a meeting of creditors will be called only if the official receiver directs the
administrator to call a meeting of creditors within 45 days, or if creditors having an aggregate of at least
25% in value of the proven claims request a meeting.42 In most cases, no meeting of creditors to vote on
the proposal is necessary. Creditors have up to 45 days to consider whether to accept or reject the
proposal. If creditors do not respond, they are considered to have accepted the proposal.43 If a sufficient
number of creditors accept the proposal, it is binding on the debtor and creditors. Where, at the
expiration of the 45 day period, no obligation has arisen to call a meeting of creditors, the proposal is
deemed accepted by the creditors. No court hearing is required, unless the administrator receives a
request from the official receiver or any other interested party within 15 days of the acceptance or
deemed acceptance of the proposal; and failing such request, the proposal is deemed approved by the
court. The debtor goes through two mandatory counselling sessions. The provisions are silent on CRA
payroll deemed trust claims. Trustees’ fees are based on a tariff.

39

See section 66.11 BIA. The administrator has to be a trustee or another person appointed or designated by the Superintendent
of Bankruptcy to administer consumer proposals. Currently, only trustees act as administrators of consumer proposals.

40

Section 66.14, BIA specifies: Duties of administrator —The administrator shall, within ten days after filing a consumer proposal
with the official receiver, (a) prepare and file with the official receiver a report in the prescribed form setting out (i) the results
of the investigation made under paragraph 66.13(2)(a), (ii) the administrator’s opinion as to whether the consumer proposal
is reasonable and fair to the consumer debtor and the creditors, and whether the consumer debtor will be able to perform
it, and..(iv) a list of the creditors whose claims exceed two hundred and fifty dollars; and (b) send to every known creditor, in
the prescribed form and manner, (i) a copy of the consumer proposal and a copy of the statement of affairs referred to in
paragraph 66.13(2)(d),

41

Section 66.12(5), BIA.

42

Section 66.15, BIA.

43

Section 66.18 (1), BIA specifies: Where consumer proposal deemed accepted —Where, at the expiration of the forty-five day
period following the filing of the consumer proposal, no obligation has arisen under subsection 66.15(2) to call a meeting of
creditors, the consumer proposal is deemed to be accepted by the creditors.
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Hence, the proceedings are highly streamlined and cost effective, saving time and resources in terms of
creditors’ meetings and court appearances where creditors and the official receiver do not object to the
proposal. When the proposal is fully performed, the administrator submits a certificate of full
performance to the debtor and the official receiver, and the debtor is thereupon discharged from all debts
that can be discharged.44
If the proposal is rejected by creditors, the stay under the BIA is no longer in effect and creditors can move
to enforce their claims, but there is no deemed bankruptcy. If a proposal is accepted and the debtor later
fails to comply with the terms of the proposal, the court, on application, can annul the proposal.45 A
Division II proposal is deemed annulled where payments under the proposal are to be made monthly or
more frequently and the debtor is in default to the extent of an amount equal to three payments; or
where payments under a proposal are to be made less frequently than monthly and the debtor is in default
for more than three months on any payment.46 The exception to the deemed annulment is where the
court has previously ordered otherwise or where an amendment to the proposal is filed before the
deemed annulment. The court also may annul a proposal where it appears to the court that the debtor
was not eligible to make a consumer proposal when the proposal was filed; where the proposal cannot
continue without injustice or undue delay; or where the approval of the court was obtained by fraud.
On annulment of a Division II proposal, creditors have a claim against the debtor for the amount owed to
them before the proposal, minus any amount the debtor paid them during the proposal. If the debtor was
bankrupt when the proposal was made and the court subsequently annuls the proposal, the debtor is
reinstated as a bankrupt on the date of the annulment.
The provisions under the BIA thus set out different processes for the business debtor, depending on
whether or not the particular debtor can fit within the criteria of the specific provisions.

3. Treatment of MSME Insolvency Elsewhere
The treatment of MSME insolvency appears to be a growing issue worldwide. The economic activities of
MSME are significant to national and regional economies globally. For example, there are approximately
20 million MSME in the European Economic Area.47 MSME are a major source of jobs and economic
growth, in particular, their potential for utilizing new technologies.48 In the United States, small and
medium-sized enterprises49 make up 99% of all firms, employ over 50% of private sector employees, and

44

Sections 66.28, 66.38 and 178, BIA

45

Section 66.3, BIA.

46

Section 66.31, BIA.

47

European Commission, “Declaring your enterprise to be an SME”, Commission communication — Model declaration on the
information relating to the qualification of an enterprise as an SME, Official Journal C 118 , 20/05/2003 P. 0005 – 0015,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52003XC0520(02)

48

Ibid.

49

Defined in their study as firms with fewer than 500 employees, Shahin Firoozmand, Philip Haxel, Euijin Jung, and Kati
Suominen, “State of SME Finance in the United States in 2015”, Tradeup and Nextrade Group, March 2015.
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generate 65% of net new private sector jobs.50 Kushnir et al report that there are 125 million formal
MSME in 132 countries for which data are collected by the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”),
including 89 million in emerging markets.51 The data collected in most jurisdictions cover only the
“formal”52 registered sector;53 and it is important to note that informal MSME, particularly in emerging
countries, often outnumber formal MSME.54 Formal MSME are more common in high-income economies,
but in low-and middle-income economies, MSME density is rising at a faster pace.55 The overwhelming
majority of formal MSME globally, 83 percent, are micro enterprises.56
Just as MSME are significant contributors to the global economy, they also fail in significant numbers. A
US study found that in 1999, 80% of US firms that filed for bankruptcy reported assets under $1 million,
and 88% reported having fewer than 20 employees.57 The OECD has observed that MSME are particularly
vulnerable to macroeconomic and financial shocks, reporting that MSME insolvencies in Denmark, Italy,
Spain, and Ireland exceeded 25% in 2007-2008.58 Thus, insolvency resolution regimes that are responsive
to the needs of MSME are particularly important.
Of significance for MSME globally are both the formal legal rules and informal societal rules and practice
norms that affect entrepreneurs, including the design of bankruptcy laws, the structure of capital markets,
and the perception of stigma related to personal responsibility.59 Cost-effective insolvency proceedings
can encourage inefficient firms to exit, encourage greater entrepreneurial activity and new firm creation,
and can result in greater returns to creditors.60 Yet one World Bank Research Paper suggests that a survey
on debt enforcement in 88 countries indicates that bankruptcy procedures are time-consuming, costly
and inefficient in being able to preserve the business as a going concern; that in only 36 percent of
countries, the business is preserved as a going concern; and an estimated 48 percent, on average, of the
business’ value is lost in debt enforcement.61 Timely resolution of financial distress can reduce uncertainty

50

Ibid at 2.

51

Khrystyna Kushnir, Melina Laura Mirmulstein and Rita Ramalho, “Counting MSMEs Across the World”, IFC,
www.ifc.org/msmecountryindicators. This database is current as of August 2010 and updates and expands on the January
2007 “Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises: A Collection of Published Data”, www.ifc.org/msmecountryindicators.

52

By “formal” is meant recognized within the regulatory structures of a country, such as for taxation purposes, ibid.

53

Ibid, except for 16 economies where data are available.

54

For example, in India in 2007, there were fewer than 1.6 million registered MSME and 26 million unregistered MSME. Ibid at
2.

55

Ibid.

56

Ibid, the authors defining micro as 1 to 9 employees.

57

E Warren, J L Westbrook, “Financial characteristics of business in bankruptcy.” (1999) American Bankruptcy Law Journal, 73:
499–589.

58

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, “The Impact of the Global Crisis on SME and Entrepreneurship
Financing and Policy Responses”, 2009 (“OECD”).

59

S Lee, M W Peng, and JB Barney, “Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship Development: a real options perspective”, (2007)
Academy of Management Review, 32(1): 257–272; M W Peng, “Institutional transitions and strategic choices”, (2003)
Academy of Management Review, 28(2): 275-296.

60

Elena Cirmizi, Leora Klapper, and Mahesh Uttamchandani, “The Challenges of Bankruptcy Reform”, Policy Research Working
Paper 5448, The World Bank Development Research Group Finance and Private Sector Development Team, 2010, at 4.

61

Ibid at 6.
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for entrepreneurs, creditors and management, and improve assets value and transparency.62 Lee et al
observe that a well-functioning MSME insolvency regime can make clear the downside risk of a venture,
in turn increasing the number and variety of people pursuing entrepreneurial activities.63 It can benefit
lenders because of the certainty in recovery rules, in turn increasing confidence in lending. The World
Bank has observed that effective insolvency systems enhance predictability and thus lender confidence in
loan recovery on default, which encourages more lending and leads to financial inclusion for more
businesses.64 The World Bank Group Doing Business report for 2014 found that among 38 selected
indicators/measures of the regulatory and institutional environment, the recovery rate in resolving
insolvency was the single most valuable measure.65
There is no globally accepted definition of MSME. As noted in the introduction, across jurisdictions there
have been numerous ways in which states have defined MSME. The chart below illustrates several
approaches:

62

Ibid at 5.

63

Lee, et al, supra note 51.

64

The World Bank Group, Doing Business Series, “Doing Business 2014 – Understanding Regulations for Small and Medium-Size
Enterprises”, accessible at www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2014.

65

Ibid, citing Kraay and Tawara (2014).
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Chart 1: Definitions of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, 2016
Region
European Union

Micro/Small
Small is less than 50 employees and turnover
≤€ 10M or balance sheet total of ≤€ 10M.
Micro is less than 10 employees and turnover
≤€ 2M or balance sheet total of ≤€ 2M

Medium
Medium is less than 250 employees and
turnover ≤€ 50M or balance sheet total of ≤€
43M.

United Kingdom

Small: meets two or more of the following
requirements—
Turnover not more than £5.6M.
Balance sheet total not more than £2.8M.
Number of employees 50 or less.
Micro: not defined.

Meets two or more of the following
requirements—
Turnover not more than £22.8M.
Balance sheet total not more than £11.4M.
Number of employees 250 or less.

United States

Aggregate contingent liquidated secured and
unsecured debts not more than $2,490,425
(excluding debts owed to affiliates or
insiders) and does not include any member
of a group of affiliated debtors that has
aggregate debts greater than $2,490,425
(excluding debt owed to affiliates or
insiders). The $2M number in the Bankruptcy
Code is adjusted tri-annually.
Micro: not defined

Not defined

Canada

Small: employing 5 to 99 employees, or in
the service industry, employing 5 to 49
employees.
Micro: employing 1 to 4 employees

Medium: employing 50 to 499 employees

World Bank

Small: employing 5 to 30 employees
Micro: employing 1 t0 4 employees

Medium: employing 21 to 100 employees

Sources: European Commission, 2014; UK Companies Act, c. 46; US Bankruptcy Code; Canada,
Market Framework Policy Branch, Industry Canada, 2015; World Bank, 2014, current to February 1, 2016

Ardic et al found that the most common definitions used by regulators are based on the number of
employees, sales and/or loan size. The most common among the three is the number-of-employees
criterion.66 The OECD countries report that MSME with less than 250 employees employ two-thirds of the
formal work force.67 Of 68 countries for which Ardic et al had data, 50 countries use the number-ofemployees criterion, and 29 out of these 50 also use the other two criteria.68 A total of 41 regulators use
maximum sales value criteria and 15 use maximum loan value criteria to define an SME.69

66

Oya Pinar Ardic, Nataliya Mylenko., Valentina Saltane, “Small and Medium Enterprises A Cross-Country Analysis with a New
Data Set”, The World Bank Financial and Private Sector Development Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, Policy Research
Working Paper 5538, January 2011 at 6-8.

67

Ibid, citing Beck et al, 2008b; Dietrich, 2010.

68

Ibid.

69

Ibid at 8.
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i.

Small and Medium Enterprise Insolvency in the United States and United Kingdom

Industry Canada asked for any lessons that could be discerned from the treatment of SME insolvency in
the United States (“US”) and United Kingdom (“UK”). While there is a special regime for small business
reorganization in the US, there is not one specifically in the UK. Moreover, other than references to the
fact that the processes in both countries are expensive and often end in liquidation, there is a paucity of
accurate information or empirical data on their effectiveness, and neither appear to be held up in the
literature as models for an effective procedure.
The US Bankruptcy Code specifies "small business debtors”, it does not refer to MSME or SME. The
relevant definitions are in 11 U.S.C. § 101:
11 U.S.C. § 101(51C) The term “small business case” means a case filed under chapter 11 of this title in
which the debtor is a small business debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 101(51D) The term “small business debtor”—
(A) subject to subparagraph (B), means a person engaged in commercial or business activities (including any
affiliate of such person that is also a debtor under this title and excluding a person whose primary activity
is the business of owning or operating real property or activities incidental thereto) that has aggregate
noncontingent liquidated secured and unsecured debts as of the date of the filing of the petition or the
date of the order for relief in an amount not more than $2,000,000 (excluding debts owed to 1 or more
affiliates or insiders) for a case in which the United States trustee has not appointed under section
1102(a)(1) a committee of unsecured creditors or where the court has determined that the committee of
unsecured creditors is not sufficiently active and representative to provide effective oversight of the debtor;
and (B) does not include any member of a group of affiliated debtors that has aggregate noncontingent
liquidated secured and unsecured debts in an amount greater than $2,000,000 (excluding debt owed to 1
or more affiliates or insiders).

The amount of secured and unsecured debt to qualify as a small business under the US Bankruptcy Code
adjusts every three years. The 2,000,000 USD limitation above in the Bankruptcy Code is now 2,490,425
USD, and this cap will adjust again on April 1, 2016. Bankruptcy Rule 1020 governs how to determine
whether a debtor is a small business debtor and how a small business reorganization case is to be
commenced.
Rule 1020. Small Business Chapter 11 Reorganization Case
(a) Small Business Debtor Designation. In a voluntary chapter 11 case, the debtor shall state in the petition
whether the debtor is a small business debtor. In an involuntary chapter 11 case, the debtor shall file within
14 days after entry of the order for relief a statement as to whether the debtor is a small business debtor.
Except as provided in subdivision (c), the status of the case as a small business case shall be in accordance
with the debtor's statement under this subdivision, unless and until the court enters an order finding that
the debtor's statement is incorrect.
(b) Objecting to Designation. Except as provided in subdivision (c), the United States trustee or a party in
interest may file an objection to the debtor's statement under subdivision (a) no later than 30 days after
the conclusion of the meeting of creditors held under §341(a) of the Code, or within 30 days after any
amendment to the statement, whichever is later.
(c) Appointment of Committee of Unsecured Creditors. If a committee of unsecured creditors has been
appointed under §1102(a)(1), the case shall proceed as a small business case only if, and from the time
when, the court enters an order determining that the committee has not been sufficiently active and
representative to provide effective oversight of the debtor and that the debtor satisfies all the other
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requirements for being a small business. A request for a determination under this subdivision may be filed
by the United States trustee or a party in interest only within a reasonable time after the failure of the
committee to be sufficiently active and representative. The debtor may file a request for a determination
at any time as to whether the committee has been sufficiently active and representative.
(d) Procedure for Objection or Determination. Any objection or request for a determination under this rule
shall be governed by Rule 9014 and served on: the debtor; the debtor's attorney; the United States trustee;
the trustee; any committee appointed under §1102 or its authorized agent, or, if no committee of
unsecured creditors has been appointed under §1102, the creditors included on the list filed under Rule
1007(d); and any other entity as the court directs.

Section 1116 describes the basic duties of a small business debtor, with a series of statutory requirements
for filing a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code proceeding:
11 U.S. Code § 1116 - Duties of trustee or debtor in possession in small business cases
In a small business case, a trustee or the debtor in possession, in addition to the duties provided in this title
and as otherwise required by law, shall—
(1) append to the voluntary petition or, in an involuntary case, file not later than 7 days after the date of
the order for relief—
(A) its most recent balance sheet, statement of operations, cash-flow statement, and Federal income tax
return; or
(B) a statement made under penalty of perjury that no balance sheet, statement of operations, or cashflow statement has been prepared and no Federal tax return has been filed;
(2) attend, through its senior management personnel and counsel, meetings scheduled by the court or the
United States trustee, including initial debtor interviews, scheduling conferences, and meetings of creditors
convened under section 341 unless the court, after notice and a hearing, waives that requirement upon a
finding of extraordinary and compelling circumstances;
(3) timely file all schedules and statements of financial affairs, unless the court, after notice and a hearing,
grants an extension, which shall not extend such time period to a date later than 30 days after the date of
the order for relief, absent extraordinary and compelling circumstances;
(4) file all postpetition financial and other reports required by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
or by local rule of the district court;
(5) subject to section 363(c)(2), maintain insurance customary and appropriate to the industry;
(6)
(A) timely file tax returns and other required government filings; and
(B) subject to section 363(c)(2), timely pay all taxes entitled to administrative expense priority except those
being contested by appropriate proceedings being diligently prosecuted; and
(7) allow the United States trustee, or a designated representative of the United States trustee, to inspect
the debtor’s business premises, books, and records at reasonable times, after reasonable prior written
notice, unless notice is waived by the debtor.

Hence while the provisions for small businesses under the US Bankruptcy Code are less onerous than for
other debtors filing under Chapter 11, the US legislation is highly codified and places numerous obligations
on the small business debtor. There are also costs associated with unsecured creditors’ committees and
court appearances.
In the United Kingdom, the vast majority of businesses are micro and small enterprises; and micro
businesses, defined as having 1 to 9 employees, constitute 95% of the private sector, with small firms
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employing 10–49 employees comprising a further 2%.70 There have been few empirical studies on small
business insolvency in the UK.
The UK legislation does not specifically use the term MSME. However, a company voluntary arrangement
(“CVA”)71 is a vehicle for SME to restructure, rather than to liquidate through bankruptcy. The CVA can be
undertaken with or without a moratorium, what we refer to as a stay in Canada, and can be coupled with
administration or be a stand-alone CVA.72 Unlike informal arrangements where debtor companies and
their creditors come to a mutually acceptable agreement, the CVA involves the assistance of an authorized
insolvency practitioner and requires court approvals at various stages.73 Cook et al found that SME
experiencing temporary financial difficulties were likely to succeed in a CVA only if they had strong
financial resources and good management.74
Interviews with the UK Insolvency Service and several UK practitioners suggest that the CVA process can
be beneficial for medium and large enterprises as much more responsibility devolves to the insolvency
professional and there is reduced court time; but it is not well suited to micro and small businesses
because of the significant administrative costs. CVA are largely used for liquidations, as often the debtor
has waited too long before filing or seeking the advice of an insolvency professional. One advantage of
the system is an early assessment by the insolvency professional of the possibility of a restructuring and
an early liquidation decision if the business is not viable. In this respect, practitioners thought it was more
accountable to creditors; the liquidation decision largely rests with the insolvency professional, thus
saving legal expenses and court time. There was also some observation that in the UK, financial reports
are generally better for all businesses, which can expedite the decision to liquidate or not on the
commencing of a CVA.
One study found a significant failure rate for CVA in terms of meeting the policy objectives of preserving
going-forward businesses.75 Frisby and Walters, in a study commissioned by the UK Government, observe
that the underlying rationale of the CVA is that it is aimed at offering creditors a better return than they
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BIS (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills) (2011), SME business barometer: August 2011:
www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/enterprise/docs/s/11-p75c-sme-business-barometer-august-2011. BIS (Department for
Business Innovation and Skills) (2012), Business population estimates for the UK and the regions: www.bis.gov.uk. See also
Eurofound, Restructuring in SME: United Kingdom, 2012.
UK Insolvency Act, 1986, chapter 48, Part I Company Involuntary Arrangements. The Insolvency Act, 1986 does not define
small business, the definition is found in the UK Companies Act, 2006.
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Sandra Frisby and Adrian Walters, “Preliminary Report to the Insolvency Service into Outcomes in Company Voluntary
Arrangements”, 2012, report commissioned by UK Insolvency Services. They observe that the CVA with moratorium
procedure was introduced for eligible companies in order to remedy a perceived weakness in the traditional CVA procedure,
in that any creditor could take enforcement action against the company thus destroying the proposal’s chances, but three
years after being put in place, the moratorium was not being widely used. Ibid at 10.

73

The Insolvency Service, Insolvencies in the Fourth Quarter 2012, Statistics release, 4 February 2013:
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140311023846/http://www.insolvencydirect.bis.gov.uk/otherinformation/sta
tistics/201302/index.htm. Insolvency Service (2013b), Guide to bankruptcy: When-Where-How-What, Department for
Business Innovation and Skills, London: www.bis.gov.uk/insolvency/Publications/publications-by-theme/insolvencypublications; G Cook, N Pandit, and D Milman, “A resource-based analysis of bankruptcy law, SMEs and corporate
recovery”, (2011) International small business journal, Vol. 30, No.3, Sage Publishing, at 275–293.
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Cook et al, ibid.
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Frisby and Walters, supra note 67. They examined over 500 CVA in 2006, documenting 13 types of outcomes.
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would realize if some other form of insolvency procedure were commenced in relation to the debtor
company.76 There is also the possibility that trade creditors might retain a customer for the future. Frisby
and Walters suggest that if creditors determine they will get at least what they would receive in
liquidation, they have little to lose by agreeing to a CVA proposal: any payments into the CVA will be held
exclusively for them, and if the CVA does not deliver the proposed return, they are entitled to prove for
the balance and receive a dividend through the subsequent realization of the debtor’s assets. Frisby and
Walters note that the main danger to creditors in this respect is that the CVA is prematurely terminated
and that the company has depleted assets that would have been available to creditors in a liquidation or
administration. However, they found it impossible to quantify how often such losses occur from the
government data available. Frisby and Walters found that in 49% of the cases, creditors received no return
at all from the CVA, but in almost a quarter of the cases, unsecured creditors received half or more of
their pre-CVA debt.77 They found that the average cost of a CVA proceeding was £25,368,78 which is
approximately 48,000 CAD, primarily for the costs of the insolvency professional. Frisby and Walters
found that only a small percentage of all CVA, about 14%, carried on business after the proceedings, of
which 83% in the sample were small businesses.79 They conclude that the CVA may represent a form of
exit rather than rehabilitation.80
One mechanism that is aimed at preventing delays in disclosing insolvency is the director liability
provisions in the UK, which require that once a director is aware the company is insolvent, the director
must stop the company from carrying on business or is liable for the debts incurred. The provision is aimed
at preventing prejudice to creditors. Second, the UK has a directors’ disqualification provision; the
insolvency professionals report on the ability of each director and can recommend that they not be
allowed to be a director. However, there are mixed views as to the effectiveness of these provisions.
Hence, neither the US nor the UK offer a model for a streamlined and expeditious process for MSME
insolvency, although there are policy discussions in the UK regarding whether or not a special regime is
required for small businesses. The next part undertakes a qualitative analysis of some Canadian data, in
order to try to better understand what goes on in MSME insolvency in Canada.

II.

THE OSB SAMPLE DATA ON BUSINESS INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS
1. Methodology

Industry Canada requested a qualitative analysis of SME insolvencies. The OSB generated a randomized
sample drawn from regions across Canada of 200 corporate business files (100 bankruptcies, 100
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Ibid at 20.
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Ibid at 37.
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For the purposes of the database, costs comprise, for the most part, the fees of the nominee/supervisor of the arrangement,
but where applicable included legal fees associated with the agreement, and any bonds, statutory advertising costs, stationary
and postage costs, insurance costs and travel costs incurred and paid by the supervisor/nominee, and any irrecoverable value
added tax (“VAT”). Ibid at 26-28.
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Ibid at 8.

80

The authors acknowledged that their data revealed more questions and limitations than conclusions and that considerably
more research is necessary. Ibid.
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proposals) where the maximum number of employees during the 12 months prior was between 5 and
100 employees, thus falling within the “small” definition of business. The data contained the following
information: type and quantum of liabilities; maximum number of employees during the past 12 months;
preferred creditors for wages, rent, etc., as indicated on List C of Form 78 Statement of Affairs Business
Bankruptcy / Proposal; and total return to creditors.81 This part examines the types of liabilities, compares
debt to assets, and examines the declared reasons for insolvency.
The OSB also provided statistics on successful completion and failure of business proposals closed in the
past two years, including reasons for failure and time to close.82 Time to close is calculated as the time
between when the estate was filed and the closing date, presented below as average time to close and
counts by bands. Also provided were a randomized sample of 100 individual business SME Division II
proposals and a randomized sample of 25 individual business Division I proposals, with the following
information: reasons for insolvency from Form 79; 83 type and quantum of liabilities; maximum number
of employees during the past 12 months;84 and total return to creditors, as indicated on the dividend
sheet. The OSB also generated some information on court-appointed receiverships from 2009-2014.85
The tables and graphs in this part were developed using the OSB data, as well as some information from
Industry Canada where noted. Overall, while the data are interesting and offer insights as to the issues
facing insolvent MSME, they are not sufficient to draw definite conclusions that could inform potential
legislative reform. However, when coupled with the responses from the trustee and loan officers surveys
discussed in Part III below, they are helpful in understanding some of the challenges for MSME insolvency.

2. Bankruptcies - Type of Debt
For small enterprise bankruptcies, unsecured debt is a significant portion of debt. Overall, the sample of
100 corporate bankruptcies indicates that unsecured debt comprised 73% of all liabilities at filing, as
illustrated in Graph 1 below.
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BKHQRA-2808 Corporate filings, Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, 10 December 2015. Due to some large data
points, we recalculated all data sets without outliers, on file with author. To determine the outliers, we set the z-score to 2.68
as per the standard used in statistics. The resulting data showed very little change to the median, but significant changes to
the mean.
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BKHQRA-2808 Proposal Outcomes, Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, 10 December 2015.
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Reasons for financial difficulty are provided in text format as the response to Question 14 "Give reasons for your financial
difficulties" on Form 79 Statement of Affairs. An individual business may choose to file either a Form 78 or a Form 79
Statement of Affairs.

84

BKHQRA-2808 Division II and BKHQRA-2808 Division I, Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, 10 December 2015.

85

BKHQRA-2808 Receiverships DRAFT Statistics on Court appointed receiverships from 2009-2014, Office of the Superintendent
of Bankruptcy, 10 December 2015.
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Graph 1: Type of Liabilities, 100 Bankruptcy Filings, 2015

Type of liability by percentage
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1%
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73%

Source of data: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, December 2015

The mean amount of unsecured debt was 682,566 CAD and the median 180,529 CAD, as indicated in the
summary data for the 100 bankruptcy cohort in Table 1 below. Unfortunately, the way in which data are
reported does not allow for an analysis of the breakdown of unsecured debt, in terms of type of debt such
as credit card debt or operating loans, and receiving the names of creditors did not assist in undertaking
this analysis. Due to some large data points, we recalculated the unsecured debt data set without outliers,
resulting in a mean secured debt of 395,357 CAD and a median of 179,938 CAD.86 While there was almost
no change to the median, it significantly changed the mean.
Secured debt for the 100 sample of corporate bankruptcies comprised 26% of the liabilities at filing. The
mean secured debt was 242,260 CAD and the median 20,000 CAD. The low median indicates that there
were a number of corporate insolvencies in which the amount of secured debt was quite low, considerably
lower than unsecured debt. Here again, due to some large data points, we recalculated the secured debt
data set without outliers, resulting in a mean secured debt of 168,544 CAD and a median of 17,566 CAD.87
Thus there was little change to the median, but significant change to the mean. With or without the
outliers, it reveals that there is a huge range of debt within this cohort of bankruptcies.
Also indicated in Table 1, total statutorily “preferred claims”, including employee wage claims, comprised
less than 1% of total liabilities on filing. We were not able to accurately separate employee compensation
claims from other claims such as rent in the preferred claim category from the way that OSB organizes its
data, although we tried from the names of creditors listed. Nonetheless, if all preferred claims comprised
such a small percentage of total liabilities, it is clear that wage claims did not comprise a significant portion
of claims on filing. As the zero median illustrates, there were a large number of companies with no
preferred liabilities. The mean amount of preferred claims was 10,621 CAD.

86
87

To determine the outliers, the z-score was set to 2.68 as per the standard used in statistics.
To determine the outliers, the z-score was set to 2.68 as per the standard used in statistics.
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Table 1: Type of Liabilities in Corporate Bankruptcies - 100 Data Set, 2015
Bankruptcies
Maximum
Number of
Employees

Total Unsecured
Liabilities

Total Secured
Liabilities

Total Preferred
Liabilities

Total Liabilities

Mean

15.71

$682,565.67

$242,260.18

$10,620.96

$311,815.60

Median

10.00

$180,528.67

$20,000.00

$0.00

$29,950.02

SD (S)

15.80

$2,894,780.33

$521,849.01

$39,349.94

$1,715,624.53

High

99.00

$29,014,270.17

$3,450,000.00

$360,791.00

$29,014,270.17

Low

5.00

$2.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

Total

1,571

$68,939,132.52

$24,468,277.70

$1,072,716.63

$94,480,126.85

-

72.97%

25.90%

1.14%

100%

Percentage of
Total Liabilities

Source of data: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, December 2015

3. Proposals - Type of Debt
In assessing the differences between proposals and bankruptcies, across the board, the liabilities of
debtors undertaking proposal proceedings were larger. For the sample of 100 Division I business
proposals, unsecured debt comprised 71.5% of all liabilities at filing, as illustrated in Graph 2 below, very
similar to that in the cohort of corporate bankruptcies. Thus the ratio of unsecured debt to secured debt
does not appear to be a factor in the decision as to what kind of proceeding to file in small business
insolvency.
Graph 2: Type of Liabilities, 100 Business Division I Proposal Filings, 2015

Type of liability by percentage
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Source of data: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, December 2015

However, the total amount of liabilities in the proposal cohort is much higher than for the bankruptcy
files. The mean amount of unsecured debt was 1,399,801 CAD and the median 577,810 CAD, much more
evenly distributed across the sample, as illustrated in Table 2 below. Secured debt for the 100 sample of
Division I business proposals comprised 28% of the liabilities at filing, with the mean secured debt 545,238
CAD and the median 113,810 CAD. Unfortunately, the OSB does not collect any information on interim
financing, so these data are not included in the proposal data. There was no obvious reason for the
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significantly higher debt in the proposal cohort, and as will be illustrated below, the level of
unencumbered assets is not an explanation of the difference. It could be that small enterprises that are
on the larger size have greater capacity to retain advisers or have the in-house expertise to develop a
sound business plan that may be acceptable to creditors, an observation made by several trustees. More
likely, the explanation is pragmatic, in that a business needs to be of a certain size before the stakeholders
are interested in investing the effort to restructure it, rather than simply liquidating and starting over.
In terms of employees, the average number for the Division I business proposal cohort was 21 employees,
and while a higher number than the average number of employees for the bankruptcy cohort, the average
amount of preferred claims was similar at 10,328 CAD. Preferred claims as a percentage of total liabilities
was even smaller here, 0.53% of total liabilities. Here again the mean of preferred claims was zero,
indicating many debtor companies with no preferred claims outstanding. Hence, at least for the
randomized sample of 200 corporate insolvencies (bankruptcies and proposals), preferred liabilities are
not significantly different, and are likely not a factor in the decision of what kind of proceeding to file.

Table 2: Division I Proposals - Corporate Filings 100 Data Set, 2015
Proposals
Maximum
Number of
Employees

Total Unsecured
Liabilities

Total Secured
Liabilities

Total Preferred
Liabilities

Total Liabilities

Mean

21.41

$1,399,800.86

$545,237.61

$10,328.16

$651,788.88

Median

10.5

$577,810.22

$113,810.00

$0.00

$83,613.25

SD (S)

24.2

$2,152,321.12

$1,548,949.98

$32,685.20

$1,629,255.83

High

100

$14,019,577.82

$12,834,570.00

$204,000.00

$14,019,577.82

Low

5

$30,788.71

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

Total

2,141

$139,980,086.40

$54,523,761.02

$1,032,816.41

$195,536,663.83

Percent

71.59%
27.88%
0.53%
Source of data: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, December 2015

100%

4. Employees
As illustrated in Table 3 below, the majority of debtors in both the bankruptcy and proposal cohorts had
fewer than 20 employees.88 That may explain, in part, why the percentage of employee claims, in
comparison to overall debt, was so low.

88

Industry Canada asked about any insights on the service industry, its definition of small enterprise is employing 5 to 99
employees, or in the service industry, employing 5 to 49 employees. However, no insights could be drawn as the information
provided by the OSB about the creditors or type of business is sparse to non-existent, so service industry could not be
separated out.
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Table 3: Number of Employees – Corporate Filings 200 Data Set, 2015
Number of Employees
Bankruptcies – 100 files
Mean
Median

Proposals – 100 files

15.71

21.41

10

10.5

SD (S)

15..8

24.2

High

99

100

Low

5

5

Total

1,587
2,141
Source: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, December 2015

Categorizing a small business as having from 1 to 99 employees may miss the underlying patterns in the
small business category. Looking at Industry Canada data more generally,89 approximately 53% of small
businesses in Canada have from 1-19 employees. The remaining 47% have 20-99 employees. These
definitions are used to further breakdown the OSB sample data. 73% of the corporate bankruptcies in the
cohort had fewer than 20 employees, compared with 63% of the corporate Division I proposal filings, as
illustrated in Graphs 3 and 4 below. The data suggest that the smallest businesses fail in greater numbers
compared with their presence in the micro and small sector in the Canadian economy as a whole,
assuming that the random sample chosen by the OSB is representative of the population as a whole. The
overrepresentation in the sample of businesses employing 1 to 19 employees and, conversely, the
underrepresentation of businesses employing 20 to 99 employees, again assuming the sample is
representative of the population, may indicate that once a business reaches a critical mass of employees
and thus economic activity, it is less likely to fail and there may be greater possibility of making a proposal
to carry on business.
It is important to note that the information on business failures maintained by the OSB is incomplete as it
does not account for small businesses that simply close down without a formal insolvency process (“walkaways”). In our inferences above, it is assumed that a business that is not reported on the OSB statistics
on business failures continues to be successful, which may very well be incorrect. However, the incidence
of walk-aways is more likely to occur in respect of very small businesses with very few employees, and if
this is the case, it would further reinforce our inference that the smaller businesses (based on employee
complement) fail at a higher rate than their representation in the population.

89

Industry Canada, 2016, www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/061.nsf/eng/02805.html.
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Graph 3: Number of Employees per Business for Bankruptcies and Proposals in Groupings of Five
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Source of data: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, December 2015

Graph 4: Percentage of Total Employees by Business Size for Bankruptcies, Proposals,
Compared with Businesses Generally in Canada90
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Sources: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy and Industry Canada

90

The OSB data are effective December 2015, www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/061.nsf/eng/02805.html, accessed March 2016, and the
Industry Canada data relating to relative size of small businesses in terms of employee complement is from 2012.
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5. Comparing Secured and Unsecured Debt Levels
Table 4 undertakes a direct comparison of unsecured liabilities between bankruptcies and proposals in
the sample data. Debtors undertaking Division I proposals have on average twice the amount of
unsecured debt. The median amounts of unsecured liabilities are also significantly different, the amount
for proposals being three times that of bankruptcies. The lowest and highest figures vary greatly.
Table 4: Total Unsecured Liabilities for both Bankruptcies and Proposals, 2015
Total Unsecured Liabilities
Bankruptcies – 100 files

Proposals – 100 files

Mean

$682,565.67

$1,399,800.86

Median

$180,528.67

$577,810.22

SD (S)

$2,894,780.33

$2,152,321.12

High

$29,014,270.17

$14,019,577.82

Low

$2.00

$30,788.71

Total
$68,939,132.52
$139,980,086.40
Source of data: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, December 2015

Table 5 undertakes a direct comparison of secured liabilities between bankruptcies and proposals in the
sample data. Debtors undertaking proposals have on average more than twice the amount of secured
debt. The median amounts are also significantly different, the median amount of unsecured liabilities for
proposals is almost six times that of bankruptcies, indicating that the distribution spread of secured
liabilities is much broader in the bankruptcy cohort. The lowest and highest figures vary greatly.
Table 5: Total Secured Liabilities for both Bankruptcies and Proposals, 2015
Total Secured Liabilities
Bankruptcies
$242,260.18

Proposals
$545,237.61

Median

$20,000.00

$117,311.52

SD (S)

$521,849.01

$1,546,358.72

High

$3,450,000.00

$12,834,570.00

Low

$0.00

$0.00

Mean

$54,523,761.02
Total
$24,468,277.70
Source of data: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, December 2015

Table 6 illustrates that there are many debtor companies in both the corporate bankruptcy and proposal
cohorts in which there are no preferred claims, as illustrated by the median of zero. As noted above, the
average amount of liabilities do not vary as between bankruptcies and proposals, and given the size of the
other liabilities, preferred claims do not appear to be a driver of filing under either process.
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Table 6: Total Preferred Liabilities for both Bankruptcies and Proposals, 2015
Total Preferred Liabilities
Bankruptcies

Proposals

$10,620.96

$10,328.16

$0.00

$0.00

Mean
Median
SD (S)

$39,349.94

$32,685.20

High

$360,791.00

$204,000.00

Low

$0.00
$1,072,716.63

$0.00
$1,032,816.41

Total
Source of data: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, December 2015

One can see in Graph 5 and Table 7 below that the average liabilities are higher for the companies that
are in the larger range of small, specifically, companies with 20 to 99 employees. Here again, there is no
difference in amount of preferred liabilities depending on firm size.
Graph 5: Amount of Liabilities and Percentage Businesses
with Liabilities by Size (Number of Employees) 201591
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Source of data: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, December 2015

91

Average liabilities by type of liability and size of the business (1-19 or 20-99).
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Table 7: Average Amount of Liabilities and Percentage
Businesses with Liabilities by Size, 2015
All Liabilities for both Bankruptcies and Proposals
Unsecured Liabilities

1-19 Employees
% of Companies
with such claims
20-99 Employees
% of Companies
with such claims

Secured Liabilities

Preferred Liabilities
Bankruptcie
s
Proposals

Bankruptcies

Proposals

Bankruptcies

Proposals

$265,387.24

$918,740.35

$162,802.83

$533,296.94

$9,528.78

$10,454.53

100%
$1,765,594.2
2

100%

64%

79%

33%

25%

$2,218,903.91

$438,692.80

$565,569.02

$13,713.16

$10,112.99

100%
100%
71%
78%
32%
Source: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, December 2015

16%

The number of employees as indicator of size of business appears to be less determinative of the
bankruptcy or proposal route as does the likelihood and amount of secured liabilities a business has.
Regardless of the size of the business, the secured liabilities were higher for business proposals than for
those businesses that entered into bankruptcy. Businesses with accepted proposals also had significantly
higher unsecured liabilities as well. Information is not yet available as to the number of these proposals
that will be successfully completed, but it may be helpful to track this information in the future.

6. Assets Compared with Liabilities
A comparison of assets and liabilities in Tables 8, 9 and 10 reveals that overall, MSME are highly leveraged,
for both bankruptcies and proposals. For both the mean and median, assets are less than secured debt.
This result is contrary to what one might have speculated - that all the assets would be encumbered in
bankruptcy files, but that there would be unencumbered assets in proposal files, which is why the latter
had a chance of devising a proposal. The data below indicate that was not generally the case. As Table 10
below illustrates, the 100 proposal files are more highly leveraged on average than the bankruptcy files,
and the larger the firm, the more highly leveraged on average. Of course, it is important to remember that
proposals often address only the unsecured debt; while secured creditors are stayed from enforcing their
claims during the stay period, if they are not included in the proposal, they continue to receive payments
and they retain their rights to enforce on their security.
Table 8: Bankruptcies – Assets Compared with Liabilities, 2015
Bankruptcies
Total Assets

Total Liabilities

Total Unsecured
Liabilities

Total Secured
Liabilities

Total Preferred
Liabilities

Mean

$246,516.61

$311,815.60

$682,565.67

$242,260.18

$10,620.96

Median

$15,150.50

$29,950.02

$180,528.67

$20,000.00

$0.00

SD (S)

$529,442.42

$1,715,624.53

$2,894,780.33

$521,849.01

$39,349.94

High

$3,116,936.44

$29,014,270.17

$29,014,270.17

$3,450,000.00

$360,791.00

Low

$0.00

$0.00

$2.00

$0.00

$0.00

Total

$24,898,177.78

$94,480,126.85

$68,939,132.52

$24,468,277.70

$1,072,716.63

Percent

-

72.97%
25.90%
Source: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, December 2015

27

1.14%

Table 9: Proposals – Assets Compared with Liabilities, 2015
Proposals

$651,788.88

Total Unsecured
Liabilities
$1,399,800.86

Total Secured
Liabilities
$545,237.61

Total Preferred
Liabilities
$10,328.16

$83,613.25

$577,810.22

$113,810.00

$0.00

Total Assets

Total Liabilities

Mean

$443,924.72

Median

$85,003.00

SD (S)

$1,386,564.57

$1,629,255.83

$2,152,321.12

$1,548,949.98

$32,685.20

High

$12,834,570.00

$14,019,577.82

$14,019,577.82

$12,834,570.00

$204,000.00

Low

$0.00

$0.00

$30,788.71

$0.00

$0.00

Total

$42,172,848.76

$195,536,663.83

$139,980,086.40

$54,523,761.02

$1,032,816.41

Percent

-

71.59%
27.88%
Source: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, December 2015

0.53%

Table 10: Debt to Asset Ratio, by Type of Proceeding and Size of Business, 2015
Bankruptcies

Proposals

Number of
Employees

1 to 19

20 to 99

1 to 19

20 to 99

Total Assets

$179,645.49

$420,859.17

$419,910.42

$485,092.10

Total Liabilities

$437,718.85

$2,218,000.18

$1,462,491.82

$2,794,585.92

Debt to Asset Ratio

2.44
5.27
3.48
5.76
Source: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, December 2015

In analyzing the leverage of insolvent businesses, it is important to note that the calculated leverage may
be skewed due to an improper valuation of the assets, as the asset values as reported in the statement of
affairs may be distorted. The assets are usually reported at their estimated realizable value, as estimated
by the person that completes the statement of affairs, and that assessment is by definition imperfect since
the person completing the statement of affairs is not an expert in valuing assets. Furthermore, while the
valuation of assets at their realizable value may be appropriate for a bankruptcy file, it may not be so in
the context of a proposal, where the assets would likely have far more value based on a going concern
than in a context of an outright liquidation. At the time of preparation of the statement of affairs,
however, the person preparing it cannot assess whether the proper valuation context should be based on
an outright liquidation or a going concern, because at that time the outcome of the proposal can be hoped
for but cannot be known with certainty. Considering that, in order to assess their options, creditors use
(at least in part) the information on the statement of affairs to estimate what would be the outcome of a
bankruptcy, the debtor will tend to complete the statement of affairs with some degree of conservatism.

7. Division I & Division II Proposals
i.

Reasons for Insolvency

In the next data set, also a randomized sample from across Canada, the reasons for insolvency were
examined. There were 25 Division I individual business proposals and 100 Division II individual business
proposals in the cohort. The Division I data set was significantly smaller, as are the number of filings under
this part of the BIA. The text below reports both together to illustrate similarities. The OSB has chosen
17 standard reasons for bankruptcy, as listed below. Using a data cleansing and parsing program, the OSB
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sorts the declared responses into causes of bankruptcy, and estates frequently have more than one reason
for financial difficulty.92 As noted below in the discussion of the reasons, there is considerable overlap or
blurring of the categories of reasons for insolvency. One recommendation going forward is that the OSB
should consider redrafting its reasons section to more clearly capture the reasons for filing.
For both Division I and Division II filings in the cohort, more than 50% of debtors reported that the primary
reasons for insolvency were “Business failure, use of personal line of credit for business” and “Overuse of
credit, mismanagement, too much debt”, as illustrated in Graph 6 below. These categories are not
sufficiently nuanced. For example, overuse of credit may be the result of a temporary downturn in the
business that the debtor believed could be bridged through temporary credit, a decision that appears
poor in hindsight, but may not be an indicator of mismanagement. There is considerable overlap in
declared reasons, with many debtors responding that both “Business failure, use of personal line of credit
for business” and “Overuse of credit, mismanagement, too much debt” were the primary reason. Clearly
governance and management issues are important, but the data do not reveal the degree of
mismanagement such that recommendations can be made. There is a similar lack of clarity in insufficient
income and loss of income, with some overlap with unemployment, such that it is difficult to draw clear
conclusions from the data. Comparatively, tax liabilities do not play a significant role in the insolvency of
these files.

Number of Respondents

Graph 6: Reasons for Insolvency by Number of Respondents
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Source of data: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, December 2015

Representing the same data as a percentage of reasons for filing a proposal, as illustrated in Graph 7, one
can observe similarities in the percentages, except for the larger percentage of Division II filings for
reasons of insufficient income or loss of income.

92

OSB, description of data, December 2015.
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Percentage of Respondents

Graph 7: Reasons for Insolvency by Percentage of Respondents
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Source of data: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, December 2015

While some of the overlap is due to unclear wording of the data fields, it is also important to note that
there are frequently multiple reasons for insolvency, and Table 11 and Graph 8 below illustrate that in the
majority of cases, debtors identify multiple reasons. 57% of Division II business debtors declared multiple
reasons for insolvency and for Division I, approximately 52% of businesses had multiple reasons for
commencing insolvency proceedings, suggesting that the majority of business failures are caused by the
interaction of more than one factor.

Table 11: Proposals - Reasons for Insolvency
by Number of Responses and by Percentage
Division I
Reason
% of
identified
Total
Business failure, use of personal
line of credit for business
Overuse of credit,
mismanagement, too much debt
Tax liabilities
Insufficient income / Loss of
income
Legal action
Loans to friends or cosigning loans
for others
Marital breakdown, divorce
Unemployment
Health concerns, medical expenses,
injuries, family deaths
Garnishee
Supporting parents,
brother/sisters, relatives

Division II
Reason
% of
identified
Total

16

37.21

61

33.15

8
5

18.6
11.63

38
13

20.65
7.07

4
3

9.3
6.98

31
0

16.85
0

1
1

4.65
2.33
2.33

0
7
15

0
3.8
8.15

1
1

2.33
2.33

8
3

4.35
1.63

1

2.33

3

1.63

30

Division I
Reason
% of
identified
Total

Division II
Reason
% of
identified
Total

Moving/relocation expenses, job
change
0
0
2
Alcoholism, drug addiction,
substance abuse
0
0
0
Bad/poor investments
0
0
0
Student loans
0
0
0
Gambling
0
0
1
Accidents/emergencies related to
property, i.e. fire, theft
0
0
2
Source: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, December 2015

1.09
0
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0
0.54
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Graph 8: Proposals – Multiple Reasons for Insolvency,
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ii.

Division I Proposal Success and Failure Rates

The OSB provided global statistics on successful completion and failure of business proposals under both
Division I and Division II of the BIA that were closed in the past two years, including reasons for failure and
time to close.93 For Division I business proposals, 74% of closed files involved successful completion of
the proposal, 25% failed by defaulting on the terms of the proposal and 1% were annulled by the court,
as illustrated in Graph 9.

93

BKHQRA-2808 Proposal Outcomes, Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, 10 December 2015.
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Graph 9: Success and Failure Rates Division I Business Proposal Files Closed
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The OSB data also reveal at what point the Division I proposal succeeded or failed, in terms of months
before files are closed. For example, the successful proposals on average were completed in just under 64
months. For proposals that failed by default, on average they failed at about 58 months, as illustrated in
Graph 10 below.
Graph 10: Success and Failure Rates Division I Business
Proposals by Number of Months before File Closed
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As illustrated in Graph 11 below, 23% of all successful proposals were completed in less than 24 months,
but 23% took more than 84 months to complete. 11% of successful proposals took between 24 and 36
months, 11% took between 36 and 48 months to complete, 9% took between 48 and 60 months to
complete, and 24% took 60 to 84 months to complete. 15% of Division I business proposals that failed
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from default failed within the first 24 months, 14% failed between 24 and 36 months, 18% failed between
48 and 60 months, and 17 % failed after 84 months.
Graph 11: Success and Failure of Division I Business Proposals by Percentage
that Closed or were Completed within a Specified Time
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iii.

Division II Proposal Success and Failure Rates

For Division II business proposals, almost 71% of closed files involved successful completion of the
proposal, 18% failed by defaulting on the terms of the proposal or because of a subsequent assignment
in bankruptcy; and 7.2% failed when creditors refused to accept the proposal (Graph 12). It is clear that
creditors continue to be active under the streamlined provisions of Division II.
Graph 12: Success and Failure Rates Division II Business Proposal Files Closed
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Graph 13 below illustrates the success and failure rates of Division II business proposals within specified
periods and by reason for success or failure. The majority of successful proposals are completed within
60 months. There is less likelihood of default by the debtor as the period of the proposal continues. As
expected, the Graph illustrates that rejection by creditors happens very early in the process.
Graph 13: Success and Failure of Division II Business Proposals by
Percentage - Closed or Completed within a Specified Time
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Thus, overall, a significant percentage of business debtors that had their proposals approved successfully
completed the terms of the proposal, 74% for Division I business proposals and 71% for Division II business
proposals. These success rates suggest that the proposal provisions are working to preserve both
businesses and value for creditors. What is not available from these data is the number of proposals that
resulted in the business being sold as a going concern versus continued in the original debtor’s possession.
The success rate of approved and completed proposals may suggest that if barriers to MSME proposals
can be removed, there could be an increase in the number of MSME proposals filed, and hopefully,
successfully completed.

iv.

Dividends to Creditors

For completeness of the record and requested information for the study, the dividends paid to creditors
in Division I and II closed estates are included here in Table 12. However, without rates of return on
bankruptcy files, the data are not particularly informative other than to illustrate that unsecured creditors
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are receiving dividends under these proposals. What would be helpful to study in the future is the amount
of return for unsecured creditors in terms of the percentage of their total claim paid in the proposal,
compared with rate of return for unsecured creditors in the bankruptcy files. We do know from trustees
surveyed that often the unsecured creditors receive nothing in a bankruptcy, because the secured lender
has security over all the assets through a general security agreement. The zero figures for secured
creditors in Division I below is not particularly surprising in that secured creditors can be outside the
proposal and continuing to be paid.
Table 12: Dividends Paid to Creditors Business Proposals – Estates Closed
Total Unsecured
Dividends

Total Secured
Dividends

Total Preferred
Dividends

Total

Total

$513,244.25

$0.00

$0.00

$513,244.25

Mean

$38,617.38

$0.00

$0.00

$29,349.21

Median

$2,580.40

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

11

0

0

11

44%

0%

0%

44%

Total Unsecured
Dividends

Total Secured
Dividends

Total Preferred
Dividends

Total

Total

$1,397,824.33

$60,389.00

$26,027.78

$1,484,241.11

Mean

$15,030.37

$5,489.91

$13,013.89

$14,002.27

Median

$10,385.73

$0.00

$13,013.89

$10,084.37

79

3

2

81

79%

3%

2%

81%

Division I

No. of Respondents
Percent of Respondents

Division II

No. of Respondents
Percent of Respondents

8. Receiverships
The OSB data on receiverships over the period since the last round of legislative amendments do not
reveal why there has been a decline in receiverships. The numbers of receiverships in 2009-2010 are likely
a reflection of the first effects of the global financial crisis and are significantly higher than for 2011
through 2014, as illustrated in Table 13 below. There were instances where a specific industry in a specific
year experienced a very significant variation in receiverships, such as in the financial and insurance sector
in 2009 and 2013. The reality is that there was simply not the time or resources in this study to examine
the changes in receivership. With the data given, we tried comparing sector patterns to GDP, currency
exchange rates and other indicators, but we concluded there were insufficient data to generate any
specific insights.
However, the ten loan officers surveyed offered a glimpse into the pattern of receiverships. The loan
officers were almost unanimous that they use private receivers rather than court-appointed receivers,
because of the costs involved in the court-supervised process, specifically, the cost of filing reports and
court appearances. In contrast, one trustee observed that after the initial court appointment, the court
tends to leave receivers to do their work, and the need for further court appearances are only for approval
of significant transactions, such as a sale of assets.
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This trend toward private receiverships was confirmed by over 15 trustees, who also observed that the
primary or secured lender is opting for private receivership to save the costs of court appearances and
other administrative costs. This statement is somewhat surprising considering that the privately
appointed receiver has the same administrative duties under the BIA and the Wage Earner Protection
Program Act94 as a court-appointed receiver. It suggests perhaps that some secured creditors are not
appointing a receiver as that term is understood under the BIA, but rather, appoint some representative
to liquidate the assets without following the statutory requirements regarding notifying employees and
creditors, reporting to the OSB, dealing with recently received merchandise, fulfilling the requirements of
the WEPPA, etc.
A number of trustees and loan officers surveyed observed that banks are often not appointing receivers
at all, but rather, appointing an auctioneer or other person to liquidate the assets, without making use of
the mechanisms under the BIA. While this strategy may be cost-effective for the secured lender, the issue
that should be of concern to the government is that the bank may be realizing on the assets without
advising other creditors, who, if given notice, might have exercised their 30-day goods remedies under
the statute. Liquidation without a receivership or bankruptcy also means that terminated employees
cannot access remedies under the Wage Earner Protection Program.
The OSB has expressed concern about this conduct of secured lenders, but currently does not have
authority to require the banks to use the BIA unless the individual or firm appointed is conducting itself
as a “receiver”.95 In a 2010 report titled “Non-Trustee Receivers”, the OSB observed that:
The fact that a person is not called "receiver" but some other name such as "agent" or "monitor" is of no
consequence. If the person takes or has taken possession or control of all or substantially all of the
inventory, accounts receivable or other property of an insolvent person or a bankrupt under a security
agreement or court order, he or she is a receiver for the purpose of subsection 243(2) of the BIA (Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act) and therefore must be a licensed trustee.
Accordingly, it is the OSB (Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy)'s position that the appointment of a
person who is not a licensed trustee in bankruptcy to act as a receiver within the meaning of subsection
243(2) is contrary to the provisions of the BIA (Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act). When such an appointment
occurs, we will request that immediate steps be taken to have the non-licensed trustee receiver substituted
with a licensed trustee in bankruptcy. Such steps may include obtaining a new or amended agreement or a
court order that provides for the appropriate substitution. If the substitution is not effected immediately,
the OSB (Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy) reserves its right to make an application to the court
to effect the appropriate appointment and to seek costs in relation thereto and in enforcing the provisions
of the BIA (Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act). 96

One issue is that of transparency. Unsecured creditors may not understand that this liquidation process
is occurring at the time it is occurring. The OSB often will not be advised that an auctioneer is acting more
like a receiver, so it cannot take action. It would seem that more research is needed into whether the

94

Wage Earner Protection Program Act, S.C. 2005, c. 47, as amended.

95

Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, ”Non-Trustee Receivers”, 20 May 2010, http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsfosb.nsf/eng/br02406.html, modified 24 March 2015. Section 243(4) of the BIA specifies that only a licensed trustee in
bankruptcy can be appointed as a receiver under s. 243(1) of the BIA or under an agreement or order referred to in s. 243(2)(b)
of the BIA.
96 Ibid at 2.
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banks really are using the BIA receivership provisions appropriately, and how the legislation could be
amended to ensure greater fairness and transparency for all creditors.
Three loan officers observed that they are more likely to do a forbearance or work with the debtor to
undertake a self-liquidation, in order to save the expense of a formal proceeding. They suggest that there
has been a shift in approach from ten years ago, in that they will work with debtors where the business
may be viable. Two loan officers observed that there has been a lot of liquidity in the market in recent
years, such that they are often able to get out of their positions without accessing the receivership
provisions of the BIA.
Another loan officer observed that other than to create a process or service that is “free” for the debtor,
it is unclear that there would be an incentive for companies with less than five million CAD in debt to
access the BIA procedures; that their clients view the use of trustees and lawyers as expensive and coming
directly out of their pockets. They distinguish this situation from medium and larger businesses where
the funds being used to hire professionals are not the personal capital of the managers, so there is less
resistance to accessing formal processes.
Four loan officers noted that there is an issue with respect to access to information, and a helpful process
might be a mechanism for a licensed trustee to do a quick “look-see” on the finances, in order to
determine whether or not it makes sense to commence a receivership or work with the debtor towards a
proposal. They observe that access to accurate financial information at the front end of the process is
one of their greatest challenges with MSME. One trustee suggested that it might be helpful to have
funding available for just a quick assessment, rather than incurring the cost of appointment of a receiver
or commencement of a proposal process just to get access to information for a preliminary assessment.
Table 13: Amount of Receiverships by Industry per Year
Industry
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and
Hunting
Mining and Oil and Gas Extraction
Utilities
Construction
Manufacturing
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Transportation and Warehousing
Information and Cultural
Industries
Finance and Insurance
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing
Professional, Scientific and
Technical Services
Management of Companies and
Enterprises
Administrative and Support, Waste
Management and Remediation
Services
Health Care and Social Assistance

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

201
4

Total

Average

18
28
1
29
54
26
22
8

11
10
2
37
72
25
50
13

10
15
4
29
46
19
21
7

26
10
4
25
47
16
23
4

13
16
4
36
42
16
15
23

14
17
4
27
43
19
20
7

92
96
19
183
304
121
151
62

15.33
16.00
3.17
30.50
50.67
20.17
25.17
10.33

4
40
53

2
18
65

6
17
45

4
10
36

15
103
31

1
13
32

32
201
262

5.33
33.50
43.67

8

15

8

13

11

10

65

10.83

22

14

9

17

14

26

102

17.00

7
3

3
5

7
12

3
9

7
8

13
15

40
52

6.67
8.67
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Arts, Entertainment and
Recreation
Accommodation and Food Services
Other Services (except Public
Administration)
Total
Average

III.

5
25

6
21

9
13

9
5

2
14

13
20

44
98

7.33
16.33

3

2

2

4

1

2

2.33

356

372

279

267

371

296
16.4
4

14
194
1
107.
67

19.78 20.61 15.50 14.72
20.61
Source: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy

323.50
34.03

SURVEY OF TRUSTEES
1. Methodology of the Trustee Survey

Industry Canada was interested in the views of licensed insolvency trustees in terms of the particular
challenges facing SME, and it made sense to also collect views on sole proprietorships and micro
enterprises. Three focus groups involving 15 trustees helped identify the issues that should be canvassed
in the survey. The survey consisted of ten questions, as set out in Appendix 1. The participation of trustees
was sought through a global email sent to all licensed insolvency trustees in Canada seeking their
participation, with the helpful cooperation of the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring
Professionals (“CAIRP”). An email request to participate was also sent to trustees that had attended the
Annual Review of Insolvency Law conference in the past five years. Although trustees self-selected to
respond, the response rate of 53 is significant. There are 217 licensed insolvency trustee firms with 1,046
individual licensed insolvency trustees in Canada97 and a number of those trustees do not deal with MSME.
Surveys were conducted in English and French and trustees had the opportunity to respond in writing or
by telephone interview. 24 trustees of the 53 who were surveyed opted for a telephone interview, which
lasted from 30 to 60 minutes. The surveys were conducted from November 2015 to February 2016. I wish
to sincerely thank the trustees that participated, as their professional insights and experience were
incredibly valuable.
In terms of surveying lenders to MSME, the goal had been to speak to a small number of loan officers (five
to ten), and here, it was much harder to get participation. Aside from general approaches to lenders in
the MSME market, trustees surveyed were asked to recommend small loan officers and other lenders
who might speak with us. We received 39 refusals to be interviewed before we found ten loan officers
willing to participate, four by written survey, four by telephone interview and two by a combination of
both. It is unfortunate that the lending community is not more forthcoming in its views or perhaps is
overly concerned that responding to an interview or a survey might breach confidentiality. I am deeply
grateful for the participating loan officers and their professionalism and willingness to be candid in their
views. There are no graphs given the small numbers, but their views are interwoven in the qualitative
analysis below.
Graph 14 offers a snapshot of participation by trustees from across the country. 50% of the respondents
were from Ontario and British Columbia, and there was significant participation from Québec, with lower

97

Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, March 2016.

38

participation rates from the other provinces. In terms of loan officers participating in the survey, two
were from Ontario, two from Québec, two from Alberta, and one each from British Columbia,
Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.
Graph 14: Percentage of Trustee Responses by Province
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Graph 15 provides an illustration of the types of practice of trustees that responded to the survey. The
survey used the parameters set out by Industry Canada for defining MSME, based on the number of
employees, and for purposes of the survey, “medium” enterprises were further divided into smallmedium and medium. By far, the surveyed trustees are dealing with small businesses, micro businesses
and sole proprietorships. The loan officers interviewed deal with all MSME sizes, typically with loans
ranging from 250,000 CAD to five million CAD.
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Graph 15: Trustees – Type of Practice by Size of Business, 2015
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Graph 16 illustrates, for each province, the percentage of the responding trustees’ practice is MSME,
which is quite high across all jurisdictions. It means that their insights are particularly relevant as MSME
comprise a very substantial portion of their practice. Graph 17 that follows breaks that number down
further by the percentage of trustee practice by region and type of MSME.
Graph 16: Percentage of Business for MSME Practitioners
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Graph 17: Summary of Responding Trustees by Region and Type of Practice
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2. Survey Results
This section summarizes the results of the survey of 53 licensed insolvency trustees, recording all
responses in graph form and then explanatory texts for many of the observations and insights. It also
discusses the responses of the loan officers interviewed, although as noted above, the graphs represent
only the trustee responses to the survey. Of note is that while the trustees have a direct personal
economic interest in any legislative reform and loan officers have their principal’s interests to consider,
the survey responses indicated a sincere effort to assess the efficacy of the system from their professional
expertise and experience.
Generally, the vast majority of trustees expressed the view that there should be amendments to the BIA
to ensure that the treatment of insolvent MSME gives viable businesses a chance for rehabilitation where
possible, and at the same time, ensures timely bankruptcy where the business should be sold or
liquidated. Several trustees discussed the problems of “midnight moves” by debtors of company assets
to avoid landlords, and shuttered businesses or orphaned companies not being wound up through formal
process because of the costs of bankruptcy proceedings. One trustee suggested considering a "deemed
bankruptcy" right away, in that sometimes there is delay and value lost to creditors even though it is clear
that a proposal is not possible. Another observed that on annulment of a Division II proposal, there should
be a deemed bankruptcy, instead of placing these estates into limbo.
All ten loan officers surveyed agreed that some legislative reform to make the process more timely and
cost effective would be helpful. Two loan officers noted, however, that there is still considerably stigma
associated with the idea of “bankruptcy”, and there is frequently a lack of understanding by debtors of
the differences between proposals and other options under the BIA.
85% of surveyed trustees believe that the statutory provisions for proposals under the BIA could be
enhanced to improve effectiveness and timeliness, as represented in Graph 18. The following Graph 19
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illustrates that a smaller majority of trustees surveyed, 73%, believe that the statutory provisions for
proposals could be enhanced to make the process less costly.
Graph 18: Statutory Provisions for Proposals under the BIA
Could be Enhanced to Improve Effectiveness and Timeliness
2%
13%

85%

Graph 19: The Statutory Provisions for Proposals
Could be Enhanced to Make the Process Less Costly

4%
23%

Yes
No

73%

No Response

Survey participants were asked for specific ways in which the statutory scheme for MSME insolvency could
be improved, and Graph 20 below represents the frequency of suggested ideas: the highest being the
suggestion to reduce the number of decisions that require court approval and greater flexibility in time
limits under the statute. Other suggestions included greater flexibility in the process, streamlining the
claims process, redefining access to proposals, greater clarification in the process, and revising methods
of trustee remuneration for MSME files.

42

Graph 20: Recommendations Frequently Made
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Below is a summary of the types of recommendations and observations made. While there are subsections describing observations and recommendations for ease of reading, it is clear that there is overlap
in some areas, and where necessary a bit of repetition. The suggestions should be read as a whole in terms
of trustees’ very helpful views on how to improve the system.

3. A Streamlined Process for Micro and Small Business
Many trustees pointed out that the objective of the provisions in the BIA is to encourage proposals for
businesses that are viable, and to allow for a timely decision as to when bankruptcy is more appropriate.
Many trustees recommended allowing for a process similar to a Division II proposal for micro and small
businesses where the number of creditors is limited and level of debts are small and straightforward.
Trustees observed that often in these cases, a stay is required to determine if a proposal can be made,
but the process of presenting and voting on the proposal could be considerably condensed. Numerous
trustees suggested that all sole proprietors should have access to the streamlined proposal restructuring
provisions without restriction on debt levels. Several trustees observed that the 2009 amendments were
effective in further enhancing rehabilitation as a priority over liquidation, but there are still barriers to
micro enterprises having access to a streamlined Division II-type process. One trustee observed that,
overall, the processes are good, and recognized as such by foreign investors and creditors, creating greater
equity and certainty of outcome.
However, more than 2/3 of the trustees and all of the loan officers interviewed reported that the BIA
provisions are far too costly for the majority of micro and small businesses, and they often cannot come
within the definition of Division II consumer proposals. One trustee observed that of every ten micro
businesses they work with, nine cannot access the insolvency process because the cost is prohibitive.
With respect to bankruptcy, because of the high minimum cost, it is difficult to file a bankruptcy if there
are no unencumbered assets. The fees for the service must be paid up front or are at risk of non-payment.
The requirements on a small corporate bankruptcy are cost prohibitive, including a creditors’ meeting

43

with no creditors in attendance, sales package/process for assets with minimal realizable value, taxation,
etc. Thus the loan officer or the trustee will often forward secured asset files to an auctioneer to sell and
pay out the bank or CRA. The difficulty is that these business owners have little protection from the
general creditors in that instance.
The proposed solutions to the cost of micro and small bankruptcy were mixed. Loan officers suggested
that there should be a service that does a quick “look-see” on viability, such that the bank can act quickly
to realize where the business is not viable. Some suggested trustees could perform this preliminary
assessment, while others proposed a trustee-type service, but supplied by the federal government.
Trustees suggested that there needs to be a mechanism to pay the professional’s fees on liquidation, as
bankruptcy is a public service, and where there are no assets to pay for the service and a secured creditor
is unwilling to pay, the debtor often simply does not file. The majority of trustees surveyed found that
the cost issue is likely the largest contributing factor to the decline in bankruptcy filings in recent years.
Loan officers reported that they simply avoid the BIA bankruptcy process because of the expense, when
they can realize directly on their security.
With respect to the proposal provisions under the BIA, the majority of both trustees and loan officers
interviewed suggested that the proposal process could be streamlined for micro and small businesses. A
streamlined proposal could redefine access to proposals, modernize notice, reduce numbers of creditor
meetings, and create a deemed approval mechanism. Opinions varied as to whether there should be a
new “Division III” for MSME, an expanded redefinition of Division II proposals to include micro and small
businesses, or elimination of the Divisions entirely, setting in place a streamlined proposal process based
on quantum and type of debt within one set of proposal provisions.
One trustee suggested that a helpful streamlining measure would be ability for the debtor to cure defaults
such as delays in meeting payment terms under the proposal without the necessity of filing an amended
proposal. The terms could allow inspectors or creditors at a creditors’ meeting to extend the payment
terms if the trustee recommends it. Such an extension should not require court approval, payment of
filing fees and additional cash flow reports. The trustee suggested that only if the quantum of dividends
to be paid under the proposal is proposed to be reduced that the debtor would have to file an amended
proposal and commence the process again. Pursuant to s. 62.1 of the BIA, defaults can be cured by the
inspectors or creditors,98 but the BIA should be made consistent across all proposals, and the use of
inspectors and creditors in such situations helps maintain the integrity of the system.99
The loan officers surveyed also supported the implementation of a streamlined process. They observed
that MSME are typically “less sophisticated” in their finances; they may only have a bookkeeper in-house
and often do not understand the benefits of engaging the services of a financial advisor or trustee. A
streamlined process where the costs of the process are clear up front may assist in overcoming this barrier
to filing.

98

Section 62.1 specifies: Default in performance of proposal —Where (a) default is made in the performance of any provision in
a proposal, (b) the default is not waived (i) by the inspectors, or (ii) if there are no inspectors, by the creditors, and (c) the
default is not remedied by the insolvent person within the prescribed time, the trustee shall, within such time and in such form
and manner as are prescribed, so inform all the creditors and the official receiver.
99

It is important to acknowledge that trustees reported that the quality of inspectors really varies, but it is nonetheless an
important integrity check.
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Graph 21 summarizes some of the most frequent recommendations on how to streamline the process.
Within these broad categories, there was a range of views, but 83% of surveyed trustees and 80% of the
surveyed loan officers supported creating a deemed approval process for at least micro and small
businesses.
Graph 21: Trustee Recommendations on Streamlining the Process
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Redefine Access to Proposals

There were numerous suggestions as to how to improve access to proposals, with the objective that the
small business person comes out of the process with a viable business, where possible. Some trustees
recommended allowing incorporated sole proprietorships, micro and small businesses to file Division II
consumer proposals. Two trustees were concerned that the word consumer misleads creditors and needs
redefining. Three trustees suggested that purely consumer proposals should remain in the Division II
provisions and all proposals relating to business activity should be dealt with in other provisions. Others
suggested that the idea of “consumer debtor” should be eliminated, and access to the streamlined process
should be dependent on amount of liabilities.
54% of the trustees’ surveyed believe that the cap for dealing with a micro or small business in a
streamlined process should be between 500,000 CAD and 1 million CAD, and 29% recommended a cap
between 1 and 5 million CAD. One trustee suggested a 10 million CAD cap for access to the streamlined
process, as illustrated in Graph 22 below. If such a new streamlined process was to come within Division
II proposals, the current cap of 250,000 CAD would have to be raised. One trustee observed that the
current Division II limit includes secured loans for automobiles or other equipment, so it is not difficult for
a small proprietorship to reach these limits. A common reason for sole proprietors, particularly
professionals, having to avail themselves of the Division I procedures, which are more costly, is because
they have secured indebtedness related to business assets like equipment and real estate that cause the
250,000 CAD threshold to be exceeded. Only one trustee thought that the current 250,000 CAD cap was
set too high.
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The decrease in business proposal filings in recent years may be partially explained by the change in the
debt cap on consumer proposals increased from 75,000 to 250,000 CAD in 2009, making that process
accessible to broader numbers of individual business debtors. Trustees reported that the increased cap
of 250,000 CAD has driven a number of businesses into consumer proposal proceedings, as
unincorporated individuals can use the less costly and more streamlined Division II process. The provisions
thus appear to have been very helpful for the unincorporated self-employed and the individual business
person in terms of benefiting from the simplified streamlined requirements of less reporting, fewer
creditor meetings and less court involvement.
Thus whether a new process would fall under a redefined Division II or Division I, or a new Division III,
there was broad support for greater access by changing the liability cap and by increasing access to the
process for incorporated micro and small businesses, including sole proprietorships.
Graph 22: Trustee Recommendations for the Amount of Cap on Liabilities
for Access to a Streamlined Process
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The majority recommended allowing inclusion of personal debts of principals of the company in a
proposal, inclusive of personal guarantees provided to third parties on MSME debts, corporate or
otherwise. Others suggested that where there is a blending of corporate and personal debt, there is need
to consider both at the same time, as business loans have to be secured with personal assets and personal
credit cards are frequently used to support the business. One trustee observed that many businesspeople
transfer assets into a limited company to protect themselves, but in the case of tools of the trade, they
are no longer exempt. Access to rehabilitation requires protecting tools of the trade in all circumstances
so the business person can earn income. Several trustees recommended creating an ability to compromise
personal guarantees in a MSME corporate proposal, which would save using two separate filings.
Several trustees suggested that access to a streamlined process should not be pegged to liabilities, but
rather, be available where debtors have a specified number of employees, such as 250 or fewer
employees. Another trustee suggested a three-fold test for access: no more than 50 employees as
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appropriate to access a new streamlined process, including lay-offs in the six months prior to filing, plus
total unsecured debt of not more than 750,000 or one million CAD; and CRA deemed trusts such as
unremitted payroll deductions not to exceed 100,000 CAD. Another trustee suggested access by number
of creditors, such as 50, plus a dollar limit of 1-2 million CAD. Finally, one trustee recommended that
access could be improved by allowing all individuals to use the Division II process, including sole
proprietorships and without limitation by debt amount, but suggested amending the consumer provisions
to include a notice of intention to make a proposal (“NOI”) and settlements with secured creditors.

ii.

Notice

Almost all of the trustees and loan officers interviewed emphasized the importance of effective notice in
both bankruptcies and proposals, an issue that becomes even more important for a streamlined process.
One trustee suggested that bankruptcy is often the most effective way to transition a business, and that
sometimes trustees pursue Division I proposals for sole proprietors where the likelihood of success is very
low, simply to have a deemed bankruptcy in order to avoid a bankruptcy notice in the newspaper. Yet
filing Division I proposals to avoid the notice requirements adds unnecessary cost for creditors in other
parts of the process.
The majority of trustees responding to the survey believe that the notice provisions under the BIA are
outdated and need to be improved. One trustee observed: “the public bankruptcy notice is archaic and
adds unnecessary costs to the process”. Advertisements are often prohibitively expensive, one trustee
reporting that in Toronto, for example, newspaper ads cost a minimum of $800 to a $1,000. Another
trustee observed that sometimes trustees refuse to do small business proposals because of the cost of
notices. Newspaper ads are viewed as ineffective, as many people no longer read the newspaper, unless
they are in a small community. One trustee suggested that few creditors are missed in the initial filing, so
the requirement of public notice to creditors is unnecessary. Others noted that if public notices are not
required in consumer proposals and summary bankruptcies, it is difficult to understand the logic for
requiring them in ordinary bankruptcies.
Numerous trustees recommended eliminating sending out notices by registered mail or ordinary mail,
suggesting that most creditors just throw out all the information mailed to them, wasting time and paper.
Trustees observed that registered mail is very costly where there are numerous creditors. However,
another trustee observed that there are few creditors that need to be sent registered mail, and where it
is required, such as for resiliation of contracts, disallowing claims and lease disclaimers, it is very important
that there is certainty the notice is received. Others suggested that it should be sufficient for the trustee
to swear an affidavit of mailing to confirm that the notice was sent to the last known address, although
there was disagreement among trustees in this respect, with the trustee observing that the cost of writing
the affidavit, then finding a commissioner of oath and swearing the affidavit, is not any more cost-effective
than registered mail or a delivery service.
Many trustees recommended that notice should be allowed to be sent by electronic means, such as email
or fax, or through a link to a website, with new standards created for assessing sufficiency of notice.
Several suggested that the first letter to creditors could be sent by mail, with an electronic link for
information, which would serve as notice for the rest of the process. Another recommendation was to
create a public notice board on the OSB website, which could replace newspaper public notice, where
creditors could check at any time to see if the business is bankrupt or in receivership. Such a service would
be highly accessible and cost effective. The question is how to ensure creditors receive effective notice of
the proceedings and of any proposed treatment or compromise of their claims.
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One trustee recommended making more summary the level of information required to be published and
disseminated regarding the initial filing of the notice of intention to file a proposal. The trustee
recommended providing stakeholders with pro forma information on what steps the debtor needs to take
in order to resolve the causes of the insolvency.
In sum, almost all the trustees surveyed suggested that it is time to explore technologies to modernize
notice under the BIA, in turn making the processes more transparent, timely and cost-effective.

iii.

Initial Stay Period, Extension of Stay Periods

There were many and diverse views about the initial stay period and extensions of stay among the 53
trustees surveyed. In terms of the initial stay, the majority believe that the initial stay for a NOI or proposal
should be automatic for all MSME, sole proprietor and consumer proposal filings. Many observed that
there is insufficient information available to formulate a proposal at the time of filing and it is necessary
to have preliminary discussions with significant creditors before formulating a proposal. The “breathing
space” of the initial stay is critically important, several trustees observing that in the face of impending
garnishments or asset seizures, trustees are forced to file a NOI and use the Division I process when a
consumer proposal with an initial stay of proceedings would be far more efficient and cost effective. One
trustee noted that the first 30 days after filing a NOI is often used to stabilize the company’s situation with
its creditors, suppliers, etc.; and that companies often manage emergencies during this period and do not
have the time to work out the terms of an eventual proposal.
Most trustees believe the initial stay period should be longer than 30 days, with recommendations ranging
from 45 days to 90 days, with 60 days most frequently suggested. One trustee observed that a 60-day
initial stay would give more opportunity to move directly to a proposal without spending time and
resources on the extension application, thereby improving efficiency and reducing costs. Other trustees
thought the initial 30 day period is sufficient, but that there is great need to streamline the extension of
the stay process. One trustee observed that “it is extremely rare for a company to be able to make a
proposal within 30 days, and the time taken to prepare a report and attend at court for an extension could
be better used continuing to work on a proposal”. The majority of loan officers surveyed supported an
initial stay period of 60 days.
The majority of trustees recommended that the trustee should be allowed to extend the initial stay unless
creditors object. The recommended periods of extension ranged from 30 to 90 additional days. Trustees
observed that the granting of the first extension is often a “rubber stamp” by the courts and the real work
on the proposal occurs or is finalized during the following 45 day period. One trustee recommended that
extensions of the stay could be given if there are positive cash flows as determined by the debtor and
reviewed by the trustee; the time for the extension would be at the discretion of the trustee, after
disclosure to creditors and an opportunity to object. Another suggestion was to give 30-60 days to prepare
a cash flow statement rather than 10 days, perhaps requiring an update once a month to keep creditors
informed. One suggestion was that the trustee should have an obligation to report accrued charges to
the primed creditors on a bi-weekly basis and the primed creditors, if appropriate could proceed to court
to set limits or other constraints on the priority charge. That safeguard could facilitate a more streamlined
approval process.
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One trustee suggested that if an independent assessment of an extension of the stay is required, official
receivers could be given authority to authorize the first extension, saving the costs of a court hearing. One
trustee recommended three 60-day stay periods, requiring just two extensions of the stay. The proposal
trustee could send creditors a notice of extension of the stay, which would then be automatic if no one
objects and the trustee certifies there was no objection. Another suggested that there should be a full six
month stay from the outset, unless creditors object. Three trustees thought that the initial stay period of
30 days and 45-day extension periods as they are currently set out in the statute were appropriate and
efficient.
Notwithstanding that the majority of trustees responding to the survey would like a more streamlined
process within the six month period, the vast majority expressed the view that the six month limit worked
well in the majority of cases, but that the court should be given authority to extend that period, as
discussed below in part vi. The loan officers interviewed also preferred the six month cap on proposal
proceedings as a general rule, but supported the idea of giving the court the authority to extend that
period in some circumstances. They were generally supportive of giving the trustee the authority to
extend the stay period at least once or twice, but noted that notice to creditors and the ability to object
to the extension were very important protections against debtors that were using the process merely to
delay inevitable liquidation.

iv.

Clarify the Distinction between Consumers and Sole Proprietor Debtors

The surveyed trustees were equally divided as to whether there needs to be a better distinction made
between consumer debtors and sole proprietors, 48% expressing the view “yes”, and 48% expressing the
view “no”, and the remainder having no opinion. Many trustees expressed the view that it is not
problematic, because the personal and business liabilities of the micro and small business person are so
intermingled it is difficult to separate them. Others, however, believe that there should be a separate
mechanism that offers businesses a streamlined process.
Many trustees suggested that there needs to be a clearer way to address the blending of corporate and
personal debt of micro and small businesses, as business loans are usually required to be secured with
personal assets, and debtors frequently use personal credit cards to support the business. The current
system masks this confluence of personal and business debt. It was recommended that the proposal
provisions should allow inclusion of personal debts of principals of companies, with no limitation, inclusive
of personal guarantees provided to third parties on MSME debts, corporate or otherwise.
One trustee observed that treating sole proprietors in exactly the same way as consumer debtors who are
not proprietors, as is the case now, does not take into account the significantly higher work load on
trustees of sole proprietors; such as dealing with the sale of business assets, corporate landlord issues,
accounts receivable,100 professional regulatory bodies, employee issues, more and often complex
lawsuits, reviewing business records, dealing with corporate tax returns, goods and sales tax (“GST”) and
workers’ compensation returns, more complex income and expense statements and therefore surplus
income calculations, sometimes the need for counsel, and, in the case of proprietors in the construction
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Which the trustee noted can involve privacy issues in the case of certain sole proprietor professionals such as lawyers.
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industry, dealing with builders’ liens. The trustee’s time input is much higher for a Division II where there
are business implications.
These observations suggest that the notion that one could simply eliminate the distinction between
“consumer” and “business” debtor in Division II of the BIA will not address the problems identified.
Another trustee observed that there should be clarity as to the distinction between personal debts and
commercial debts, perhaps considering whether the system should provide for different treatment of
liabilities based on the nature of those liabilities. Two trustees believe a sole proprietor should be treated
like other businesses in both bankruptcy and in proposals. However, one trustee observed that if cash
flow requirements for a sole proprietorship are made consistent with the Division I format, it will overly
complicate things where record keeping for debtor is really only focused on requirements for annual tax
filing. One trustee noted that it would help the sole proprietor files if there were an ability to compromise
personal guarantees, or an ability to fashion a joint proposal for the MSME and the owner/director.
One trustee suggested that Division I proposals should only pertain to a “true business venture”, not to a
sole proprietor or micro business based on the amount of liabilities, defining a true business as business
operations that employ at least five employees.

v.

Reduce Types of Decisions Requiring Court Approval

Many trustees observed that proposals are essentially a new contract between the debtor and the
creditors, and that if the creditors approve, there should be limited court involvement necessary. Many
recommended a process similar to the Division II consumer proposals, where court involvement is
minimal. The majority of responding trustees believe that courts add costs due to the administrative
burden, and that reducing the amount of court time would have a meaningful impact. A deemed approval
approach to MSME proposals should still allow for court hearings where a creditor requests it. One trustee
observed that the biggest barrier is where a MSME knows it will need an extension, but cannot afford the
cost of the court process to obtain it; for example, the success of a proposal or viability depends on a
future event, expected to take place more than 30 days in the future, but requiring the protection of a
stay of proceedings. If one were to eliminate the requirement for court approval for an extension, if
unopposed, it would allow that business a chance to survive.
Numerous trustees recommended reducing the need for supplemental court orders. They observe that,
currently, a great percentage of the Division I proposal provisions that are automatic, such as the stay,
must be supplemented by a court order that clarifies the authority of the trustee or provides other relief
such as interim financing. Such requirements negate the streamlined benefits of the Division I proposal
provisions and increase the costs associated with the proceedings.
Two trustees suggested that if the value of assets is low and below a certain level, the trustee should be
able to realize on the assets without having to go to court for approval if there are no inspectors. However,
another trustee observed that this right already exists under ss. 30(1) and 30(3) of the BIA, which specify
all the powers the trustee can exercise either with approval of the inspectors, or where there are no
inspectors, on the trustee’s own authority.101 However, the trustee cannot sell or otherwise dispose of
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Section 30(1) specifies: 30.(1) Powers exercisable by trustee with permission of inspectors — The trustee may, with the
permission of the inspectors, do all or any of the following things: (a) sell or otherwise dispose of for such price or other
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any of the bankrupt’s property to a person who is related to the bankrupt without the court’s
authorization, which serves as an accountability check on the integrity of the sale. To do otherwise might
create incentives to inappropriately lower the value of the asset to be sold to a related person.
One trustee suggested keeping the requirement for court approval of Division I proposals. Another
observed that the court and registrar involvement should be maintained as it assists with monitoring and
serving as final arbiter of issues. Another trustee believes that registrars keep trustees honest, and they
also give trustees peace of mind that they are acting appropriately and “getting it right”.
Suggestions were made that the trustee should be given authority to take actions (fee draws, lawsuits,
etc.) if no inspectors have been appointed, and that monitoring responsibilities should be clearly
delineated to improve the efficiency of the trustee’s monitoring activities for material adverse changes.
Small corporations are often highly dependent on a principal shareholder and the business is not easily
saleable to a third party. The BIA currently requires court approval for the sale of assets to related parties,
including the principal shareholder, and one trustee was of the view that the test for approval of such a
sale is onerous. Several trustees observed that if the creditors approve a sale to a related party, it should
be sufficient, assuming the proper disclosures have been made regarding relationships. It would save
unnecessary costs and reduce burden on the court. Trustees also recommended that court ratification of
a Division I proposal should only be required if a creditor opposes the ratification or if the trustee presents
a report recommending the refusal of the proposal. What is important is to ensure that the court is
available to preserve the integrity of the insolvency system, to protect the public interest and public trust.
Trustees noted that the cost of the multiple court applications for extensions are prohibitive and are a
barrier to filing, trustees reporting that each court appearance to extend the time costs between 5,000
and 10,000 CAD. A suggestion was made to maintain the initial day stay period, but allow the first
extension to be automatic unless creditors in a specified number object, saving both time and costs in
seeking court approval for the extension. In such instances, the system would have to ensure proper
notice and information to creditors, the OSB and other significant stakeholders, with an opportunity to
object. There was concern expressed by two trustees that any streamlined process, including rethinking

consideration as the inspectors may approve all or any part of the property of the bankrupt, including the goodwill of the
business, if any, and the book debts due or growing due to the bankrupt, by tender, public auction or private contract, with
power to transfer the whole thereof to any person or company, or to sell the same in parcels; (b) lease any real property or
immovable; (c) carry on the business of the bankrupt, in so far as may be necessary for the beneficial administration of the
estate of the bankrupt; (d) bring, institute or defend any action or other legal proceeding relating to the property of the
bankrupt; (e) employ a barrister or solicitor or, in the Province of Quebec, an advocate, or employ any other representative, to
take any proceedings or do any business that may be sanctioned by the inspectors; (f) accept as the consideration for the sale
of any property of the bankrupt a sum of money payable at a future time, subject to such stipulations as to security and
otherwise as the inspectors think fit; (g) incur obligations, borrow money and give security on any property of the bankrupt by
mortgage, hypothec, charge, lien, assignment, pledge or otherwise, such obligations and money borrowed to be discharged or
repaid with interest out of the property of the bankrupt in priority to the claims of the creditors; (h) compromise and settle any
debts owing to the bankrupt; (i) compromise any claim made by or against the estate; (j) divide in its existing form among the
creditors, according to its estimated value, any property that from its peculiar nature or other special circumstances cannot be
readily or advantageously sold; (k) elect to retain for the whole part of its unexpired term, or to assign, surrender, disclaim or
resiliate any lease of, or other temporary interest or right in, any property of the bankrupt; and (l) appoint the bankrupt to aid
in administering the estate of the bankrupt in such manner and on such terms as the inspectors may direct. Section 30(3)
specifies: (3) If no inspectors —If no inspectors are appointed, the trustee may do all or any of the things referred to in
subsection (1).
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the court’s role, should not add codification to the BIA unnecessarily. The BIA should facilitate
arrangements, proposals and bankruptcies, but has become too expensive; streamlining would create
greater access, being truer to the intent of the legislation.
One trustee recommended that there should be an ability for the trustee to assist the debtor to obtain a
charge for minimal interim financing without court approval; because often, the cost of obtaining court
approval and the time required to get court approval in place is prohibitive to companies that require a
small amount of additional funding during the initial stay period.

vi.

Is the Six-month Maximum Period to Devise a Proposal a Barrier to Filing?

Related to the question of the role of the court is the issue of the statutory maximum period of six months
afforded by the BIA. Currently the court does not have the authority to extend the statutory period. The
loan officers surveyed generally observed that the majority of cases are resolved well under the six month
limit, but that the court should be given authority to extend the time limit where circumstances warrant,
such as where parties are very close to concluding agreement on a proposal.
When asked if the six month limit to devising a proposal is a barrier to filing, 57% of trustees surveyed
disagreed, as illustrated in Graph 23 below. One trustee observed that normally a viable company should
know where it is going after the first six-month period, and thus the period is not a barrier to filing since
companies experiencing financial difficulties are experiencing them in the short term. The trustees that
were opposed to the courts having the authority to extend the time limits took the view that the six
months provides timeliness and certainty for the debtor and the creditors and should be maintained.
Graph 23: Six-month Limit is a Barrier to Filing a Proposal
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However, 68% of surveyed trustees expressed the view that the court should have express authority to
extend the time limit in particular circumstances, as illustrated in Graph 24. More than half believe that it
should be left to the court’s discretion, but half of those trustees expressed the view that the
circumstances should be limited to exceptional circumstances, as reflected in Graph 25 below.
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Graph 24: Court should have Express Authority to Extend the Period
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Graph 25: Flexibility in Six-month Time Limit for Proposals
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Trustees reported that the vast majority of MSME cases can be finalized within six months, but that some
flexibility would be helpful for medium enterprises. Six months is usually sufficient, but there are cases
where additional time is warranted and a “hard” deadline of six months is overly restrictive. Trustees
observed that more time may be required if there is a complex situation with many issues or where the
viability of the company is dependent on the outcome of an event outside of the six-month time limit.
Sometimes a sale of a major asset or business division or the finding of an investor can take longer, and
the inflexibility may mean value is lost. Circumstances that could require an extension of time include an
imminent sale of the company, imminent conclusion of a new financing contract, or where the debtor
company has an important government debt for source deductions and requires time to negotiate with
CRA or time to create a reserve fund that allows for the payment of the source deductions within six
months of the court approval of the proposal. Trustees observed that for enterprises of any complexity,
there is no certainty that six months can be sufficient to address the required operational changes and
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then prove to skeptical creditors that as a result of those changes, things will be different going forward;
to resolve claims to enable a proposal to be formulated; and then to hold the requisite creditor meetings
and court approval process. The majority supported amending the legislation to allow such discretion, if
the court is satisfied that the company continues to act in good faith and no creditors are materially
prejudiced by the extension.
Some trustees suggested that extensions of the stay period are not really needed because the trustee can
use a “holding proposal”. The holding proposal specifies how much additional time the debtor needs and
creditors vote on that basis, allowing creditors, rather than the court, to make the decision to extend.
However, there was serious disagreement among the responding trustees about the integrity,
transparency and legality of this strategy, some trustees fully supporting it and others calling for a clearer
and more accountable method of extending the time. Several trustees reported that they have tried filing
a holding proposal to remove the need for extensions and also to extend the time for filing the definitive
proposal, subject to creditor approval; but given the statutory restrictions, the court has rejected holding
proposals that extend beyond six months. 20% of responding trustees noted that the only option now is
to artificially convert the proceeding to a CCAA proceeding in order to extend the timing, which leads to
unnecessary additional costs and is usually an inappropriate mechanism to use for the size of the business.
The court’s ability to extend the time for the proposal would be a more appropriate way to address cases
where particular circumstances warrant an extension.
With respect to when the court should exercise an authority to extend the six-month period, there were
a number of suggestions. One trustee observed that the court’s discretion should take into account the
size of the file, claim valuation, complexity of issues, and level of support from creditors. Several trustees
observed that the debtor should be required to show that it is acting in good faith and that there is a
compelling reason why more time is required. Most trustees thought that the courts should be left to
determine the types of circumstances that warrant an extension. Such circumstances might include issues
regarding refinancing, licencing and other issues associated with restructuring or due to the seasonal
nature of the business or industry; real progress being made on coming to successful solutions; or a new
fund provider, partner or buyer needing more time to perform or complete due diligence. Such decisions
were thought best determined on a case by case basis with an experienced judge. One trustee
recommended that in addition to the court being satisfied as to the diligence of the debtor in pursuing
and advancing a viable proposal, some objective criteria could be developed to establish benchmarks to
establish that progress.
There were four trustees who thought the maximum period to devise a proposal in the BIA should be
extended to one year, with more flexible stay periods of two or three months. Another suggestion was to
allow the trustee to extend up to the first six months and then the court thereafter for the next six months.
There was strong support for reducing the number of court appearances for the extensions of the stay, as
discussed above. One trustee suggested that the six-month time limit could be extended for bigger
enterprises, such as where total debts exceeded a fixed amount, for example, one million CAD.

vi.

Improve the Claims Process

The vast majority of survey responses in respect of improving the claims process were directed at issues
related to CRA and to claims regarding the Wage Earner Protection Program (“WEPP”), both of which are
discussed below in separate sections. The most frequent suggestion was finding a way to have greater
flexibility vis a vis government claims. There were a few additional suggestions made, but trustees
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generally expressed the view that the claims process is quite effective. One recommendation was that
there should be an ability to compromise personal guarantees in a MSME proposal.
One trustee recommended that if an arm’s-length creditor does not dispute the company’s declared
amount of debt, there should be a simplified claim form or no form at all, to expedite the process. Several
trustees recommended a standardized form or electronic communication, by which the creditor could
acknowledge that it agrees with the claim amount disclosed by the debtor. A number of trustees
recommended allowing creditors to be paid electronically instead of by cheques as a way to expedite and
streamline the claims process. Trustees also suggested that they need a period of time to bring everything
up to date in terms of accounting. Trustees asked for more flexibility on the location requirement for the
first meeting of creditors.
Three trustees suggested that there is a need for clarity in partnership, where one partner is filing a
proposal, but claims can be made against the partnership. A lot of small businesses have not been
structured properly, and there is no documented partnership agreement. In a formal partnership that
comes to an end, there should be a mechanism for part of the business to carry forward. Other trustees
suggested that there need to be clear rules for joint proposals of related companies in the treatment of
claims.
In terms of assets that are available to satisfy claims, one trustee observed that if a sole proprietor
incorporates, “tools of the trade” are no longer exempt; and that tools of the trade need to be protected
in all circumstances so that the person can continue to have access to them to continue earn income. A
“tools of the trade” type exemption is needed for micro and small businesses, leaving a baseline of
equipment not subject to the claims of CRA or secured creditors.

vii.

A Mechanism for Deemed Approval of Proposals

Trustees recommended that a streamlined proposal process for MSME in the BIA should require holding
a meeting only if requested by the creditors, similar to a Division II BIA consumer proposal. Many
recommended that for micro and small businesses, there should be no statutory requirement for a
meeting of creditors where proper notice is given, unless a requisite number of creditors, such as 25%,
request a meeting. Another suggestion was to eliminate the creditors’ meeting and have electronic voting
on a proposal. The majority of surveyed trustees and loan officers expressed the view that if the goal is
speed and ease of restructuring micro and small businesses, then a deemed approval mechanism makes
sense, because creditors would still be able to object and seek a court hearing.
Many suggested that trustees should be given authority to proceed to canvass creditors, and where a
requisite number are in support, or not opposed to, a proposal, it should be deemed approved.
Recommendations for the amount of opposition that would be required ranged from 25% to 50% of the
proven dollar value of debt with a “headcount” of creditors opposing also recommended as between 25%
and 50%. There were many recommendations to change the voting threshold for approval of proposals
to a simple majority in value and head-count, trustees suggesting that 2/3 dollar value does not seem to
be logical if the objective is to rehabilitate businesses where possible, since a lower dollar threshold should
improve the approval rate of proposals. Several trustees suggested that the deemed approval of the
proposal could be 15-30 days after the acceptance of the proposal by the creditors at the meeting of
creditors, or by electronic voting. Another trustee recommended that if there are less than five creditors
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in the estate, the statute should dispense with a meeting of creditors and allow the voting by letter or
electronic vote only. Trustees would be required to monitor to ensure integrity of the system.
One trustee observed that in moving to a deemed process for creditors to vote on proposals filed by
smaller enterprises, it may be more realistic to define micro and small business in terms of numbers of
employees rather than assets/liabilities.
Not everyone surveyed recommended a deemed process for approval of MSME proposals. One trustee
noted that “the present situation where the vote on the proposal is held at the meeting of creditors
approximately 21 days after the filing of the proposal should be maintained. It allows all creditors to
participate in the process and also avoids double notices to creditors”, a first notice sending out the
proposal and a second one in the event the creditors would require a meeting of creditors. Others felt
that creditors’ meetings should still be mandatory. One trustee observed that a “problem with proposals
generally is that creditors must write off amounts for reasons that they may not be able to control. If a
debtor is a strategically important supplier or vendor, then there may be good reason for creditors to
support a restructuring”, but “that is generally difficult to establish in a smaller MSME debtor.” One
trustee expressed the view that the current regulatory framework for proposals is adequate; however, in
regard to micro and small employers where there are no trust claims and no secured debt or no
restructuring of secured debt and a limited asset value, a deemed approval process would reduce some
of the costs of restructuring.

4. Addressing the Reasons for Insolvency in the Proposal
Prior to the survey, trustees anecdotally observed that proposals can be problematic in that they usually
do not specify how the reasons for the insolvency of the business are being addressed in the proposal,
leaving creditors at a disadvantage in their consideration of whether or not to support the proposal. When
asked in the survey whether there should be a requirement for the debtor or trustee to disclose how the
reasons for insolvency are being addressed, the survey responses were mixed. As Graph 26 below
illustrates, 62% reported that the proposal should specify how the reasons for the insolvency of the
business are being addressed in the proposal, while 32% responded no. The 6% “other” was because the
trustees were already undertaking this reporting to creditors.
Graph 26: Should the Trustee be Required to Disclose How the
Reasons for the Financial Difficulties were Addressed by the Debtor?
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Trustees observed that more details on the turnaround would be beneficial to the creditor group voting
on the proposal, giving them more insight prior to having to decide how they will vote. It would allow
creditors to more intelligently evaluate the likelihood that the debtor can carry out the proposal. It is the
most frequently asked question at meetings and expressly requiring it to be addressed in the proposal
sent to creditors may reduce the number of requests for meetings and increase the number of yes votes.
Many survey respondents suggested that the trustee’s report on the proposal should include how the
reasons for the insolvency of the business are being addressed, together with the trustee’s view on why
the proposal is better than bankruptcy in terms of potential viable business going forward.102 Too often
the causes of insolvency are not addressed adequately by the proposal process. The proposal process
simply focuses on the level of debt relief that can be achieved and not on providing any assurance that
the debtor has instituted operational changes that will enable the enterprise to both succeed in the short
term and avoid its past mistakes in the longer term.
A few trustees believed that the reasons for insolvency should be expressly disclosed on the statement of
affairs of the debtor. Trustees observed that it is important to understand/disclose how the MSME failed
and what steps have been taken to correct the situation. It would ensure that the process is transparent
and reduce the risk of debtors filing simply to delay liquidation, rather than addressing the underlying
problems. A deemed annulment process, similar to a Division II proposal, ensures monitoring costs are
kept to a minimum and creditors’ rights are revived quickly in the event of default.
The “no” opinions referred to the fact that the reasons are not always relevant, or that creditors will raise
the issue if they wish to know, and that it should be left to the parties who are interested and who will be
involved in the post-restructuring business. Others suggested that it should be up to the discretion of the
trustee, and thus not legislatively specified. A number of trustees suggested that the better route is to
incorporate such reporting into CAIRP’s best practices. One trustee observed that creditors are in a better
position to assess the risks of the proposal being completed as they may have had a longer relationship
with the debtor and had access to/or could have requested financial information. There was also concern
expressed that while the reasons are important for personal insolvency, they are less important for
corporate proposals. One trustee observed that the suggestion that the proposal provide specificity on
how those causes are being addressed presumes a level of diligence in ferreting out all of the factors
impacting the causes of insolvency in the first place. There is often not the scope of mandate or funding
available for the trustee to undertake a sophisticated and independent review of the operations to
determine the real causes of insolvency beyond a few summary observations. In smaller files, there is
seldom an ability to really drive down into the operation to differentiate between general economic issues
affecting the business and the structural inadequacies of the management team, and doing a critical
evaluation of where the debtor company sits in relation to its key competitors.
There was concern expressed that specifying how the proposal would address the reasons for insolvency
would unnecessarily raise the cost of proposals because the trustee would have a higher legal obligation
to investigate and give an opinion. Such a requirement would likely increase the proposal trustee’s
obligation to monitor post filing; trustees reporting that detailed analysis of the reasons for insolvency
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One trustee observed that where there are specific issues driving the insolvency, for example gambling, it is important to
advise creditors and advise of the counselling or other action taken to address the reasons for the insolvency.
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and how they are being addressed would add unnecessary professional costs to the process. Trustees
observed that the reasons for the insolvency and viability of the MSME are addressed at the preliminary
assessment and during the cash flow review, and from a practical perspective, major secured creditors,
new lenders, significant unsecured creditors will have to have their issues regarding such matters
addressed in order to achieve support for a proposal. Trustees suggested that outside of the financial
terms of the proposal, the proposal should focus on why the proposal is better for creditors and the debtor
than any realization in a bankruptcy scenario, with some explanation as it relates to a go-forward business
plan. It would move the onus for highlighting the benefits of the proposal to creditors towards the debtor
and away from the trustee. To gather sufficient knowledge would be time consuming and defeat the
intent of modifications aimed at streamlining the process. There was also concern about creditor apathy,
that creditors do not care about reasons, their interest is the money they get out of the proposal.
The loan officers surveyed had a different view, suggesting that it would be helpful to understand how a
proposal is aimed at remedying the reasons for the financial distress. Two loan officers noted that they
already try to discern this information from the debtor and the proposal trustee.
5. Is a New Source of Interim Financing Needed?
The trustees and loan officers were asked whether or not there should be a source of funding available,
such as a program to provide temporary loans or loan guarantees to MSME that address their financial
difficulties until the enterprise can again access other sources of capital. Here there was a very strong
majority of 74% of trustees who were opposed to this idea. 15% of surveyed trustees supported the idea
and 11% had other responses, illustrated in Graph 27 below.
Graph 27: Is a New Source of Interim Financing for MSME Needed?
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A majority of trustees responded that there are capital market providers who are already available to fill
this need in Canada, including the availability of further secured debt from primary lenders, credit unions,
the Business Development Bank of Canada (“BDC”), high yield and high risk lenders, and companies that
do factoring; so in their view, there is no need for a program to provide temporary loans or loan
guarantees to MSME that address their financial difficulties until the enterprise can gain access to other
sources of capital. B-lenders already exist and their interest rates reflect the additional risk they take in
providing these loans. A number of trustees suggested that part of the problem that enterprises
encounter in seeking solutions to their financial difficulties is that they wait too long to take corrective
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action, so no amount of capital will assist. One trustee noted that a pool of funds would just provide
further capital to delay the inevitable liquidation. The issue is frequently the lender’s confidence that the
debtors will manage their existing cash flows going forward. Lenders with expertise in MSME are the most
qualified and adept at assessing the risk level of new credit compared with the potential for a turnaround
of the businesses.
None of the loan officers interviewed thought that a new financing mechanism is needed. They believe
that there continues to be sufficient liquidity in the market to finance viable businesses; and that the issue
really is that the debtor waits too long before trying to access the financing; for example, coming to seek
financing only the night before a payroll is due that they cannot meet. Loan officers reported that often,
by the time the debtor discloses the financial distress, there is no longer a viable business to save.
Trustees strongly believed that the market has been consistently sufficiently liquid and competitive in
recent years such that viable proposals get funded. Their view was that the debtor should obtain new
financing through the market; if a company can’t access funds, it is likely insolvent and the government
would be throwing good money after bad. Ten trustees observed that if there was a governmentsponsored program, it would likely be untimely and unwieldy, and would create the wrong incentive for
businesses, a sentiment echoed by two loan officers. One trustee observed that creditors are already
essentially providing interest-free financing going-forward, given the compromise or arrangement under
the proposal, and that is sufficient to address the financing issues; it would be inappropriate to funnel
public money into the debtor. Another trustee observed that there is adequate capital available in the
private markets, and if a company is unable to access other sources of capital, then a governmental agency
should not be risking its capital with temporary loans or guarantees. One trustee suggested that there is
no way the government should give taxpayer money to companies facing bankruptcy unless it secures a
prime position with regards to assets. There were a lot of responses about market forces being sufficient
here, although some trustees thought that secured lenders’ best practices could be better developed in
terms of forbearance or extending financing for a limited period. One trustee observed that if a quasigovernment fund existed, entrepreneurs would seek this funding rather than look to correct the problems
of their business, skewing incentives for business rehabilitation
A number of trustees expressed approval for exploring the idea of such financing, but were concerned
about the private/public divide of such sourcing, and the problems of monitoring and accountability.
Trustees observed that it is easy for larger companies to get financing, but MSME often have to go to
asset-based lenders and their rates and repayment schedules are prohibitive. Timeliness of access to such
financing would also be key, because a number of businesses fail and value is left on the table because
the financing cannot be arranged fast enough. Any financing should be for working capital going forward
and not directed to paying pre-filing secured claims. Several trustees thought a mix of public/private
“lights on” financing might work, such as a special part of BDC’s SME financing program to provide some
interim post-commencement financing while the proposal is being developed. Several trustees
responded that such financing would have to weigh the risk of default against the potential jobs and other
going-concern value being preserved, and questions were raised regarding the priority of such financing,
in terms of whether it could have the current priority of interim financing set out in the BIA. Trustees that
supported the idea of new bridge financing observed that there are already sufficient turnaround funds
for large companies, but there isn’t much available for the small companies because the banks don’t want
to get involved. If there was a source available for the small companies, it would need to be at low cost
and low interest. One trustee observed that government guaranteed loans may be of use in case of a
proposal that has passed the approval process in terms of creditor support.
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A number of trustees said that a form of financing would be to allow deferral of deemed trust monies
owing to CRA to be extended out to a year, so in essence, the government would be lending money
without all the administration, but that the “loan” should not be extended further. CRA could extend the
time for repayment; they suggested retaining the current six month deadline to repay, but develop a
policy on principles or conditions under which to extend repayment if CRA determines the proposal is
viable and there are good prospects for payment.
Numerous trustees noted that the last round of legislative amendments to the BIA provided for interim
financing on a priority basis and that these provisions resolved any issues in respect of bridge financing
pending a proposal and going-forward business strategy. While not frequently used, it has facilitated a
deeper market for distress financing, with clear criteria. Several trustees cautioned that the court needs
to be careful in its oversight as to the amount of fees and accessibility of rates, because there is potentially
prejudice to other creditors. Trustees reported that the only issue should be how to streamline the
decision process if the trustee supports the financing and the creditors do not object.

6. Would Mediation Assist the Proposal Process for MSME?
Trustees were asked if mediation would assist in better identifying whether or not and how a MSME
business could be rehabilitated. 78% of the trustees surveyed responded “no”, as illustrated in Graph 28
below.
Graph 28: Would Mediation Assist MSME proposals?
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The surveyed trustees overwhelmingly expressed the view that mediation would not assist, and that
creditors were unlikely to participate in a mediation to identify whether or not and how a MSME business
could be rehabilitated. Trustees already play a mediation role in circumstances where there is potential
rehabilitation of the business and parties have an interest in a going-forward relationship. Most often
trustees are involved in conversations with the debtor and senior lenders prior to a filing. Trustees believe
they already assess the situation and determine if the parties are willing to utilize mediation. There were
strong views that making mediation a requirement would complicate the process and make it more
expensive. One trustee observed that the problem encountered time and again is the recalcitrance of the
owner/manager to accept that real change, including the loss of control, may be necessary to actually
address the problems of the business. As a related point on rehabilitation, trustees observed that there
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are instances where the trustee would have recommended basic business/financial counselling for
directors of insolvent companies in a restructuring proceeding.
One trustee observed that formal mediation is not needed, but it could be stipulated that as part of trustee
duties, they meet with the debtor and senior lenders to open lines of communication, evaluate their
relationship and serve a mediating role; but this requirement could be difficult if there are many classes
of creditors. There were numerous reported responses that the mediation provisions in consumer
proposals were really unproductive, and five trustees had negative experiences with mediation under the
Farm Debt Mediation Act in terms of cost involved versus any benefit. Mediation is only effective if there
are a limited number of parties; it would not work with a large number of creditors or if the situation is
very complex.
One trustee observed that more mediation between a debtor and its stakeholders will directly correlate
to improved proposal outcomes. Another suggested that perhaps the only time there would be some
utility in mediation is a situation where there has been a default in a proposal term, prior to an automatic
bankruptcy.

7. Canada Revenue Agency as Creditor
The survey asked whether there were any issues with Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) with respect to
BIA proposals or bankruptcies of MSME, which may hinder the basic objectives of the legislation relating
to rehabilitation, fresh start and promoting restructuring over liquidation. Trustees were asked to rank
any issues they identified by order of importance. While some of the issues identified are not within the
purview of Industry Canada’s direct policy mandate, the responses illustrate a significant problem with
CRA as creditor, which may require some legislative change to address.
CRA is an involuntary creditor in BIA proceedings; it becomes a creditor because of the debtor’s inability
or unwillingness to pay taxes and statutory remittances. Its role as creditor is to protect the public interest
in its enforcement positions. The statute creates a deemed trust and places the Crown at the top of the
hierarchy of claims, recognizing the importance of tax collection for the general public. Generally, the
concerns expressed by trustees were not with respect to required remittances or the efforts by CRA to
collect tax, but rather, concern about the failure by CRA to respond in a timely manner to important
decision points during BIA proceedings. MSME are particularly prejudiced by this lack of timeliness, as the
business often cannot survive the wait for CRA to make a decision. Premature liquidation also results in
value lost to CRA. Graph 29 outlines the issues and concerns most frequently raised by trustees in the
survey responses, and Graph 30 represents their ranking by order of importance.
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Graph 29: Issues with CRA as Creditor, Frequency that Concern was Raised
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Graph 30: Issues with CRA as Creditor, Importance Score
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1= 7 points; 2 = 6 points; 3 = 5 points; 4 = 4 points; 5 = 3 points; 6 = 2 points; 7 = 1 point.

i.

Systematic “No” Vote on Proposals

An issue raised by the majority of trustees surveyed is that the CRA systematically votes no on proposals,
resulting often in otherwise viable businesses being liquidated. Many trustees observed that CRA exhibits
a lack of understanding and support for the notion of rehabilitation through a proposal, resulting in one
arm of government working contrary to the policy goals of another federal government department that
supports the notion of business rehabilitation. Trustees observed that this systematic voting against a
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proposal is an important issue, but that experience with CRA appears to vary widely between CRA offices.
Some offices automatically vote no, the staff arguing that debtors unable to pay their share of taxes are
somehow dishonest, while other offices are more pragmatic, considering the proposal terms on a more
business-like basis. One trustee observed that CRA votes no to every proposal and requests a meeting to
ensure that its vote is registered.
Another prevalent concern was the excessive amount of time that it takes CRA to react to a proposed
proposal, taking so long to make a decision that the business ends up being liquidated. Other trustees
commented on CRA apathy, not voting on proposals at all. In some files, GST owed, which is a debt able
to be compromised, is a significant portion of the debt, but CRA does not vote. Recommendations to
address this issue included increased training for CRA staff, particularly in accounting and business
decisions; and more consistent communication and direction to CRA staff to understand the federal
government’s public policy choice to try to rehabilitate viable businesses through BIA proposals. Ten
trustees recommended imposing required timelines on CRA to respond to proposals, so that issues can
be resolved in a timely fashion, with a deemed vote in support after a specified period of time if CRA has
not responded, or conversion of the deemed trust to an ordinary claim if CRA fails to respond. One trustee
suggested that CRA could consider more positive votes for proposals, but treat the vote as a form of
further financing of the debtor, a form of interim financing that has priority over other claims.

ii.

Withholding of Refunds until the Proposal is Fully Performed

The majority of trustees surveyed reported that the withholding of refunds until a proposal is fully
performed is problematic, in that refunds help provide a source of capital to MSME to carry on the
business, although a number of trustees expressed the view that it made good business sense for CRA to
withhold and the practice did not affect other creditors. One trustee noted that while the courts had said
that CRA cannot withhold refunds on this basis, CRA staff do it anyway, often unchallenged because of
the legal costs that would be involved to fight the decision. Another trustee’s experience was that if the
pre-filing GST debt is fully paid, CRA will start to release its refunds prior to a proposal being fully
performed.

iii. Government Set-off of Pre- and Post-Filing Claims
One trustee’s experience is that until a GST debt has been compromised, i.e. that the proposal has been
performed, CRA sets off post-filing refunds to a pre-filing debt, whereas all other pre-filing debt is stayed.
The trustee observed that CRA enjoys those income tax credits instead of the debtor company, whereas
no other creditor is afforded that opportunity. Moreover, CRA often issues an assessment to the debtor
company in respect of the GST component of the accounts payable, thereby creating a pre-proposal debt
that did not otherwise exist, which it uses to set off post-proposal refunds. The assessment of the GST
component of the accounts payable becomes a duplicate claim, since the same amount is also claimed by
the trade suppliers as part of their provable claims.

iv. Treatment under Section 60(1.1) of the BIA
Many trustees observed that the six-month period after court approval of the proposal to pay section
60(1.1) debts may be too short for micro and small enterprises, considering the funds generated from the
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operating activities. While fewer trustees identified this issue as problematic, there were many
suggestions as to how to remedy the problem. A good company may not be able to respect this condition,
in turn precipitating bankruptcy. Many trustees observed that a significant barrier to proposal approval
is the CRA’s refusal to waive the six month requirement for payment of its super-priority claims in
proposals, despite being permitted to do so under s. 60(1.1) of the BIA. Section 60(1.1) specifies that
unless the Crown consents, no proposal is to be approved by the court that does not provide for the
payment to the government within six months after court approval of the proposal, of all amounts that
were outstanding at the time of the filing of the notice of intention or of the proposal, that are of a kind
that could be subject to a demand under ss. 224(1.2) of the Income Tax Act (ITA); any provision of the
Canada Pension Plan or of the Employment Insurance Act (EIA) that refers to ss. 224(1.2) of the ITA and
provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the Canada Pension Plan, an employee’s
premium or employer’s premium, as defined in the EIA, and of any related interest, penalties or other
amounts; or any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to or refers to ss. 224(1.2) of
the ITA.103 The provision is an important protection for the Crown, and ensures that debtors do not prefer
other creditors and fail to pay taxes either in the period leading up to a proposal or based on the terms of
the proposal itself. However, a number of trustees suggested that the provisions are too rigid, and that
there are circumstances in which the debtor needs longer than six months to pay the amounts owing. In
some instances, it may be sufficient to defeat a proposed proposal. Another trustee observed, however,
that willingness to extend the period is dependent on the relationship between the CRA and the debtor;
CRA is making its best efforts to recoup amounts owing, and if debtor maintains a payment schedule, the
trustee’s experience is that CRA may give extensions.
Several trustees recommended that the payment of the super-priority debt should be allowed over 12
months instead of six months, but that it would be reasonable to require monthly payments and current
compliance. A period of 12 months could eliminate the financial hardship that MSME face in paying so
quickly during the period the debtor is trying to turn around the business; and such a period would greatly
enhance the prospects for the proposal to succeed. One recommendation was that CRA’s payroll-related
claims in a proposal should be limited to the actual deemed trust amount accrued in the 12 months
preceding the initial bankruptcy event, without penalties and interest, suggesting that any claim beyond
that is rewarding CRA negligence in collection activity. Another suggested that there needs to be equal
treatment of deemed trust owed in proposals and bankruptcy. Three trustees recommended that the six
months should be extended to 18 months, which could be paid in monthly installments to demonstrate
good faith. Others observed that there is currently no distinction in the section between a natural person
and a company and there should be, in that a natural person such as a tradesperson often has much less
cash flow than a business/company.
Some trustees observed that under Division II of Part III of the BIA (consumer proposals), there is no
equivalent to section 60(1.1) BIA, which means that a debtor can be allowed up to five years to pay;
however, CRA often demands that the consumer debtor’s proposal provide for a priority payment
equivalent to that under section 60(1.1) BIA in its favour as a precondition to voting in favour of a
consumer proposal. One trustee suggested that if there is a payroll remittance liability for a sole
proprietor, that debtor should not be allowed to file a Division II proposal as CRA is requesting compliance
clauses that do not comply with the BIA as it is written at this time; in the trustee’s view, the BIA should
contain provisions similar to s. 60(1.1) in Division II proposals.

103

Section 60(1.1), BIA.

64

One trustee observed that a proposal may be on track for the business, but then the directors may have
to put in a second proposal for themselves as they have to pay CRA; and that a more holistic approach is
needed.

v.

Claim that the Deemed Trust Applies to Property Acquired After the Date of Bankruptcy

Trustees reported that CRA has claimed that the deemed trust applies to property acquired after the date
of bankruptcy, including income and inheritance, and while it is usually unsuccessful, it is costly and
lengthy in time to resolve the dispute, disadvantaging both the debtor and all the other creditors.

vi.

Other - CRA Administrative Issues

Trustees observed that CRA’s refusal to use e-mail and sometimes fax results in long delays in the trustee’s
ability to make decisions while awaiting mailed documents. One trustee observed that CRA statements to
proposal debtors still show the full amounts owing until the proposal has been completed. Others
complained of poor record keeping by the CRA, often failing to distinguish between bankruptcy, proposal,
receivership, agency appointments, and other insolvency appointments. That view was echoed by several
of the loan officers interviewed. One trustee observed that CRA often refuses to accept or acknowledge
a technical deemed year-end, which can create problems for administration of the estate. Another
trustee suggested that CRA should be prepared to pay for the fair and reasonable out of pocket costs of
financial institutions in retrieving and printing data that is required for CRA to audit GST and source
deductions due by absconding taxpayers. CRA investigators should be more transparent in sharing
information required by a receiver or trustee and ordered by the court.
The majority of trustees surveyed reported a general unwillingness by CRA to negotiate; an arrogance in
CRA staff using their priority position to extract more from the debtor than it is capable of paying, creating
conditions for failure of the proposal. Several trustees suggested that dealings with CRA need to be
improved, in that trustees and the CRA seem engaged in a constant and unproductive set of differences.
One trustee observed that the CRA staff treats both insolvency professionals and debtors with a lack of
respect. One trustee observed that because of the deemed trust, CRA is the highest priority creditor, yet
seems not to understand that the trustee is working also in its interests in terms of trying to craft a
proposal that will give greater returns to creditors and allow the business to survive. Another observed
that CRA could significantly increase recoveries by making trustees allies rather than enemies. One trustee
noted that CRA seems incapable of making business decisions, and when staff just follow bureaucratic
rules, assets are left to waste. Several trustees observed that there is poor understanding of the public
policy underlying proposals or their practical value, and that intensive training should be undertaken with
all CRA staff.
One trustee suggested that there are systemic problems with CRA that lead to premature bankruptcies,
which could be easily fixed, observing that many sole proprietors and small companies are good at their
business but terrible at bookkeeping and tax filings and get into trouble from a failure to file GST. The
exemption from GST filing has been 30,000 CAD since the 1980s and is in need of an update in terms of
the threshold required to file and pay GST. The trustee suggested that the amount for which a micro or
small business should be required to charge GST should be raised from the current cap of 30,000 CAD to
60,000 CAD, allowing MSE a better chance at survival and avoiding many bankruptcies. Trustees also
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observed that the T5018 reporting of contract payments has caused a lot of bankruptcies, and that if CRA
demanded a 10% hold back on subcontractors, this issue would be mostly avoided.
Four trustees surveyed reported that they found CRA straight-forward, predictable to deal with, so the
issues identified may be a regional governance problem. One trustee observed that the real problem is
that there is a different set of rules for each CRA office; he deals with four different tax offices and each
one is different.

8. Additional Recommendations
There were several additional observations and recommendations made as to how to improve the
treatment of insolvent MSME under Canadian law, which did not fit neatly into one of the topics above.
A number of trustees expressed the view that as MSME are a majority of businesses in Canada, there
should be better information and education to help new businesses commence and be successful.
Another expressed concern about ethics in business today, which may also speak to the need for greater
education.
Trustees observed that MSME are increasingly being tied to the financial affairs of the company’s
principals. There is a general piercing of the corporate veil with little protection for company owners from
creditors. This trend creates the need for two administrations: corporate plus personal, which adds to
the overall insolvency administration cost and can lower creditor recovery.
Two trustees observed that the 30-day goods rule is ineffective and should be revisited or eliminated,
although others did not identify this remedy as in need of reform. Several trustees recommended that a
debtor advocacy agency is required, as exists in other jurisdictions.
Several trustees suggested having banks held more accountable for their decision making processes and
involvement in the insolvency proceeding; one factor detrimental to the insolvency process is the inability
of most major banks to move at the same speed in decision-making as the insolvency professional and
the debtor companies. One trustee suggested a need to find a way to involve secured creditors more in
the proposal process without giving them a complete veto power; their ability to refuse to negotiate with
creditors often destroys any chance for recovery for other creditors.
One trustee suggested that there should be a better and clearer process for dealing with the
principals/managers/employees of insolvent companies who fail to cooperate with the trustee or receiver
or actively interfere with or sabotage the bankruptcy or receivership proceedings. The trustee noted that
in a consumer bankruptcy, these matters are principally dealt with at the bankrupt’s discharge hearing;
but there is no similar process for the non-bankrupt principals of an insolvent company. OSB special
investigations of fraudulent activity on the part of debtors can take years, with little benefit to the
creditors. The trustee/receiver may end up having to hold the file open for years, and testify in court,
with no benefit to the estate. The party funding the insolvency proceeding may have no interest in funding
the trustee to testify in a fraud hearing, long after the business has been wound up and the assets sold.
Sometimes the funding party may even be the same person who is the target of the investigation.
One trustee suggested that the cost of a statutory bankruptcy, in situations where there are employees
subject to WEPPA, could be paid by a provincial agency such as the Ministry of Labour, addressing
employee access to WEPPA and also orphaned companies. There is a high cost of CRA and other
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government agencies following up on orphaned companies that are not under insolvency administration
and have been abandoned. A federal agency could be created that would hold these orphaned companies;
and the trustee suggested that trustees could then bid on tranches to complete the bankruptcy of these
companies, and realizations on assets would offset the cost of the administration with any shortfall paid
by the government.
Several trustees expressed concern about unqualified and unregulated debt counsellors, who charge a lot
of money and give a lot of advice without adding value to the process, suggesting a qualification process
should be put in place or they should be banned from giving advice.
Finally, there were concerns expressed that the counselling fee of 85 CAD is too low to provide a real
service to debtors, and the amount should be raised to at least 200 CAD so that appropriate time can be
spent with the debtor. Some trustees are outsourcing the counselling and it is not helpful in assisting
debtors because there are not resources to spend the time needed.

9. Trustee Responses on the Wage Earner Protection Program
Although not directly related to only MSME insolvency, the 53 trustees surveyed were asked their views
on whether the effectiveness of the WEPP would be enhanced by modifying the involvement of insolvency
professionals in the administration of the program. The majority of trustees supported the objectives of
the WEPP and reported that returns to employees are higher with this program in place. One issue
repeatedly raised was that where an insolvency filing is not made, employees are unable to access the
WEPP to recover outstanding wages; thus creation of a low cost restructuring proposal would increase
the recovery to employees. Trustees recommended that the WEPP be extended to all employees whose
employment is terminated due to the employer’s insolvency, not just those employees of employers that
are bankrupt or in receivership. They cited numerous instances that have highlighted how inequitable the
current program is. Trustees’ concerns related to the administration of the problem.
Graph 31 below represents the responses to ten specific questions asked, in terms of which of the
following tasks should be performed by the trustee/receiver (“T/R”), which should be performed by the
employees (“E”) and which should be performed by Service Canada (“SC”) without involvement of the
trustee/receiver. Trustees were given the opportunity to make additional observations and
recommendations.
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Graph 31: Recommendations Regarding Reform of the WEPP
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Notifying the
Providing
Computing the
employees of the employees with claim amount
existence of the
an estimate of
program
their claim based
on the employer’s
records

SC

T/R

E

Investigating the
records of the
employer to
assess the
amount due to
the individual
employees

Multiple

No Response

Verifying claims

Administering
payments to
employees

Advising the
Wage Earner
Protection
Program of the
amount due to
the individual
employees

70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Reporting on
claims filed

Filing claims

SC

T/R

E

Multiple

Ensuring that a
claim has been
filed against the
estate for the
salary claim

No Response

Generally, surveyed trustees accepted that trustee/receiver involvement in the program was important,
but the majority suggested that improvements are needed in the administration of the program. There
were serious concerns expressed regarding the administrative duties currently imposed on trustees,
which many of the surveyed trustees found unnecessarily burdensome and prejudicial to employees’
interests.
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i.

Notifying Employees of the Wage Earner Protection Program

In terms of who should notify employees of the existence of the program, the majority of trustees, 60%,
observed that this task should be the responsibility of the trustee or receiver, 15% reported it should be
Service Canada, and another 10% reported that it should be a combination of the two. At the point of
receivership, employees are experiencing heightened stress and need assistance in determining their
access to compensation.

ii.

Investigating and Estimating the Compensation Owing

62% of trustees observed that the trustee/receiver should be the person to provide employees with an
estimate of their claim based on the employer’s records, although 19% thought it should be Service
Canada. In terms of investigating the records of the employer to assess the amount due to the individual
employees, 49% of trustees surveyed believe that it should be the trustee/receiver, 32% believe it should
be Service Canada, and 6% believe it should be a combination of these roles. In actually computing the
amount of the claim, only 42% believe it should be the trustee/receiver, 19% believe it should be Service
Canada and 17% believe it should be the employees themselves. Thus there was a mix of views on how
precisely the amount owing is ascertained.
One trustee observed that there are situations where the amount of an employee’s claim is unknown, the
business books and financial records are incomplete, and a legal determination in addition to an
arithmetical calculation is needed, but the provincial ministry of labour will only audit in limited situations.
The trustee recommended that Service Canada or the provincial ministry should perform audits when
requested, which would allow for certified data to use for employee claims.
One trustee observed that complications with the WEPP often arise due to the fact that there are often
part-time employees, employees who work irregular week hours, some who have received vacation pay
and others not, some who were on call but not working as of the date of the bankruptcy, and that there
can be difficulties establishing the amounts covered in the six-month period prior to the filing of the
proposal or notice of intention to make a proposal.

iii.

Access to and Filings Claims with the Wage Earner Protection Program

Regarding who should advise the WEPP of the amount due to the individual employees, 53% of trustees
observed that it should be the trustee/receiver, 19% thought it should be Service Canada, and 8% thought
employees themselves should have this responsibility. Several trustees observed that many, if not the
majority, of employees simply do not have the capacity to complete their proof of claim, either because
of financial literacy issues or lack of sufficient comprehension of English to understand the process; they
need the trustee/receiver’s assistance. These barriers can cause delays in administering WEPP claims
because it can be difficult to get employees to sign off on the proof of claim and then to file their claim
with Service Canada. One trustee recommended there could be a single unified claim filed with Service
Canada, which then becomes a proof of claim in the insolvency proceeding or then Service Canada files a
single subrogated claim with the trustee setting out the individual employee particulars as an annexed
schedule.
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For the actual filings of claims, 25% of trustees observed that it should be the trustee/receiver, 11%
thought it should be Service Canada, and 43% believe it should be the responsibility of the employees
themselves. A number of trustees thought that the filing should be streamlined, allowing numerous claims
to be filed with the WEPP simultaneously.
Another issue raised by numerous trustees was the rigidity of interpreting access for employees. Trustees
observed that there are numerous cases in which the business closes and there are no assets, but
employees are retained past the date of receivership, negating entitlement to termination and severance.
There should be a streamlined process to ensure employees receive payment, regardless of how the
business is finally wound up. For example, where a receiver can sell the business as a going concern and
thus the employees are not terminated on appointment of the receiver, but within a couple of weeks the
sale falls through, Service Canada will not recognize the claims, as the employees were not terminated on
commencement of the receivership. When the WEPP denies all claims where employees work for the
debtor company past the date of receivership, it creates inappropriate incentives to terminate employees
prematurely, even where value might be preserved if a sale of the business as a going concern is possible.
Other trustees reported that the electronic Trustee Information Form (“TIF”) should allow a trustee to
indicate the specific circumstances that need consideration. One trustee observed, for example, that
there is no answer field to indicate the date of the initial bankruptcy event, such as a CCAA filing; and if
the company subsequently became bankrupt, the WEPP automatically (wrongly) rejects the WEPP
application if the bankruptcy occurs six months after the CCAA filing.
One trustee reported that as trustee/receiver, they work with the debtor company records to ascertain
the amount and make-up of employee claims; they disseminate that information to the employees via a
pre-populated proof of claim (“POC”) and if the employee agrees with the calculation, he or she signs the
POC and returns it; then the WEPP form is commenced if necessary. If the employee does not agree with
the calculation, they are free to complete their own POC, a process that the trustee has found works well.

iv.

Verifying Claims

In terms of responsibility for verifying claims, 51% of trustees observed that it should be the
trustee/receiver and 28% thought it should be Service Canada. Yet 11% of trustees observed that it should
be the trustee/receiver administering payments to employees and 74% thought it should be Service
Canada. With respect to who should report on the claims filed, 42% of trustees observed that it should be
the trustee/receiver and 36% thought it should be Service Canada.
Three trustees observed that on the federal government website, the words “gone through a
restructuring” appear, and yet are not in the WEPPA, suggesting that it is confusing regarding which claims
may be verifiable. Their concern highlights the above-noted problem that employees who are terminated
in a proceeding that is not a bankruptcy or a receivership, such as in a liquidating CCAA process, do not
have access to the WEPP, creating both inequity for employees and incentive effects for parties to avoid
the administrative problems in dealing with the WEPP.

v.

Overall Responsibility for Administration of WEPP Claims

There was division of opinion on whether the responsibility for the administration of the program should
fall to the insolvency professionals or Service Canada. Many trustees believe that the government is highly
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inefficient and needs to commit considerably more resources; and that it would disadvantage employees
not to have the trustee/receiver participate in the process. Trustees reported that Service Canada does
not have the resources to manage the program; that after the trustee/receiver advises Service Canada it
is ready to pay the claims, Service Canada may take weeks or months to confirm amounts. The other view
is that the WEPP is a government service, and should be administered entirely by the government. These
trustees suggest that the trustee/receiver should only have to notify the government of the proceedings
and the government should notify the employees, calculate their claims, collect employee claim forms
and submit them to the trustee/receiver on behalf of the employees. The trustee/receiver should be
responsible to give access to employee records to Service Canada, which should determine and administer
employee claims and then file one claim on behalf of all employees with the trustee/receiver who can
deal with that claim in accordance with the provisions of the BIA.
There were other administrative inefficiencies reported in the survey responses, such as the fact that the
WEPP does not put the name of the debtor company on their statements, only an estate number appears,
which generates work for the trustee to look for the debtor company name each month. Trustees also
report that it is an incredibly time consuming manual process to provide Service Canada with the required
information. One trustee noted, for example, that they have developed an excel spreadsheet based on
the provincial ministry of labour’s audit report that they use to track the pertinent WEPP details and that
they use it as a mail merge template to populate correspondence to employees and to pre-fill proof of
claim forms. But Service Canada requires that the trustees/receivers manually key in data. The trustee
suggested that there could be an excel type form that could be simply uploaded to Service Canada, which
could then be periodically updated if a number changes, or a new claim has been filed, a change that
would save a tremendous amount of duplicated work and time.
One trustee raised concerns about the WEPP withholding 6.82% of the amount of payment when paying
out on a claim, without explanation. The trustee used the following example: the employee has a secured
claim for $950, and the trustee has no money to pay it. A TIF is completed and filed; the WEPP accepts
the $950 claim, withholds paying $65 (6.82%) and pays $885 to the employee. WEPP is then subrogated
to the estate for $885 and the employee receives a T4A from the WEPP for $885. Months later, the trustee
pays out on secured claims, and must pay the WEPP $885 and pay the employee $65 as the balance of his
or her claim. The trustee notes that this process is a huge “make work” project for the trustee, who must
pay both the WEPP and the employee, and produce a T4A form for $65. The trustee observed that Service
Canada has not explained the purpose of withholding the amount, and has informed the trustee that it is
not a fee and is not related to source deductions. The trustee recommends that if the WEPP accepts the
entire $950 claim as legitimate, it should pay the entire amount if it is within the cap. Another trustee
observed that if someone is collecting unemployment insurance, they will get the unemployment
insurance less the WEPP amount, creating unnecessary administrative costs for no benefit.
More than 30 trustees recommended a streamlined expedited process, suggesting some of the following
elements: the trustee/receiver verifies the employee worked at the company and their payroll amount,
and meets with employees to explain the process, ensure they have all their contact details to pass along
to Service Canada; the WEPP then pays a lump sum equal to a specified number of weeks, such as eight
weeks of their regular salary with tax withheld; the WEPP pays the employees within two weeks,
electronically where possible; and the trustee/receiver and directors sign off on the amount. One trustee
observed that employees need their money immediately to pay rent and other expenses and 99% know
exactly how much is owed to them; therefore one way would be to have the employees electronically file
their claim and be paid within two weeks by Service Canada; employees would need to know if they
applied for too large an amount, the CRA would request the excess back; and the trustee would confirm
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that they were an employee and verify the amount owed at the end of the process. Four trustees
suggested that one possible streamlined measure would be that employees could all be eligible for exactly
the same amount, a flat rate, and the trustee would confirm that they were an employee owed amounts
and then the amount paid out. Another trustee suggested abolishing the six-month period and include in
the program all wages, vacation pay and benefits owing as of the time of bankruptcy up to a maximum
determined amount, which would administratively simplify the process.

vi.

Filing Claims in the Insolvency Proceeding

25% of trustees observed that the trustee/receiver should ensure that a claim has been filed against the
estate for the salary claim, 45% thought it should be Service Canada, 6% thought it should be the
responsibility of the employees themselves, and 8% suggested it was a combination of the
trustee/receiver and Service Canada. Many suggested streamlining the process, as suggested in the
discussion above.

vii.

Other Suggestions and Recommendations

Somewhat of concern, five of the 53 trustees reported that they generally avoid files that require working
with the WEPP. Two trustees recommended eliminating the program and using unemployment insurance
enhancements in place of it. One trustee observed that a WEPP files currently costs several thousands of
dollars to administer and there is not fair compensation to trustees for doing it. Almost half of the trustees
responding to the survey reported that the compensation to the trustee/receiver needs to be reformed
to pay for the service being provided, that most are completing the WEPP process for no compensation.
Trustees suggested there is need for a mechanism to compensate the trustees/receive for work with the
WEPP, such as a % or flat fee for each employee, and if the estate doesn't have the funds, the
trustee/receiver should be able to apply to Service Canada for a fee at a specified amount per employee.
One trustee suggested that the BIA and WEPPA should be aligned regarding the time periods covered,
because an employee’s claim has to be re-calculated several times should a company move through
different insolvency proceedings, leaving room for errors.

10. Revise Method of Approving Trustee Fees
Surveyed trustees were asked: “What problems, if any, are there with the administrative and payment
structure under the BIA and should there be a different mechanism for assessing fees under the BIA rather
than to wait until the end of the process?” In response to this question, there were so many and varied
answers that it was difficult to sort and summarize them. They highlight the need to have a serious
discussion with the professionals and the stakeholders involved. While fees are clearly in their economic
self-interest, the structure of payment now may also serve as a barrier to effective functioning of the BIA
in respect of MSME insolvency.
i.

Payment of Fees

Trustees’ suggestions included the following possible changes to payment of fees:
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104



Clarify the process for approval of pre-filing fees. Where a NOI is used, it was suggested that it be
clarified that the debtor, up to the point of the creditors meeting, can pay the trustee. Postapproval fees can be paid as set out in the proposal without any need for comment letters or
taxation, implementing a form of deemed approval, with creditors having the right to file an
opposition to the discharge of the trustee.



Eliminate the requirement for costly, time-consuming taxation for Division I proposals where the
OSB has given a clean letter and no creditor objects.



Repeal or amend section 39 of the BIA limiting the fees to 7.5% on small realization files.104



Institute a deemed approval process for fees where the OSB has provided a positive comment
letter.



Enhance the mechanisms for approving interim draws, including, allowing the debtor to approve
these draws prior to the creditors meeting; and/or allowing fees to be paid on the presentation
of invoices based on an hourly rate because the size of an insolvent company does not always
govern the complexity of the file.



Some trustees recommended implementing a tariff based on a flat fee per file or hours expended,
without the need for taxation, unless the OSB requests it. Other trustees felt this fee structure
might penalize small firms involved in complicated files, preferring instead a system of fees linked
to both outcome and merit.



Some trustees suggested that requiring approval of interim draws by both the inspectors and
registrar/master was unnecessarily costly, suggesting approval of only inspectors appointed
pursuant to the BIA, or a system of interim payments based on milestones reached, subject to
objection by the creditors.



Other trustees wanted to retain the present system in cases of some complexity or wanted to
retain court approval subject to providing notice to the creditors.

Section 39 specifies: 39. (1) To be voted by creditors —The remuneration of the trustee shall be such as is voted to the trustee
by ordinary resolution at any meeting of creditors. (2) Not to exceed 7 ½ per cent —Where the remuneration of the trustee
has not been fixed under subsection (1), the trustee may insert in his final statement and retain as his remuneration, subject
to increase or reduction as hereinafter provided, a sum not exceeding seven and one-half per cent of the amount remaining
out of the realization of the property of the debtor after the claims of the secured creditors have been paid or satisfied. (3)
For carrying on debtor’s business or in case of a proposal —Where the business of the debtor has been carried on by the
trustee or under his supervision, he may be allowed such special remuneration for such services as the creditors or the
inspectors may by resolution authorize, and, in the case of a proposal, such special remuneration as may be agreed to by the
debtor, or in the absence of agreement with the debtor such amount as may be approved by the court. (4) Successive trustees
—In the case of two or more trustees acting in succession, the remuneration shall be apportioned between the trustees in
accordance with the services rendered by each, and in the absence of agreement between the trustees the court shall
determine the amount payable to each. (5) Court may increase or reduce —On application by the trustee, a creditor or the
debtor and on notice to such parties as the court may direct, the court may make an order increasing or reducing the
remuneration.
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Still others suggested interim draws should vary with the length of the discharge period and be
allowed when court appearances are required.



There was a suggestion that trustees should be allowed to charge $25 per NSF transaction and
$85 for a missed counselling session over and above the tariff amounts, arguing that these events
imposed costs for which the best recovery of the tariff in a summary bankruptcy is at the fifty
percent level.105



Other suggestion made in connection with this issue included:
o
o

allowing trustees to keep any interest below $250 on the trust account; and,
providing a deemed discharge of the trustee 30-60 days after filing of final statement of
receipts and disbursements with the OSB and final payment of dividends to creditors.

Overall, it is clear that the payment system needs some revisiting, to clarify when proceedings are tariffbased; to streamline decisions about interim payments; and to avoid costs in those decisions.

ii.

Priority of Administrative Fees

Trustees also recommended that a fixed amount should be designated for trustee fees and costs, in
priority to CRA, so that the process can proceed rather than the company just closing its doors, without
the need for a court order. Trustees are licensed and highly supervised by the OSB, which should prevent
any misuse of such fees.

IV.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM

There were many and diverse types of recommendations made by trustees and loan officers, the
professionals that work daily within the existing statutory framework. The suggestions contained above
should all be considered by the government as it moves forward in its discussions regarding legislative
reform. My suggestions here pull out some of the recommendations for which there was the greatest
consensus, or where the idea is novel and warrants consideration, but the arbitrary selection in this part
does not diminish the importance of Industry Canada considering all of the above insights and
recommendations.
Moreover, this study did not canvass the views of any other stakeholder groups, such as trade unions and
trade suppliers, and the legislative reform process should engage with a much broader community
regarding a range of possible options for legislative reform of the treatment of MSME insolvency.

105

NSF is “non-sufficient funds”.
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For consideration:
1. There is need to consider a streamlined approach to bankruptcy of micro and small businesses, so
that MSE can access formal proceedings; such a process would counter the current trend of secured
creditors simply realizing on their assets without regard to other creditors’ interests.
2. There should be a new streamlined framework for micro and small enterprise proposals that is
administratively simpler and eliminates the need for repeated court appearances. The MSE proposal
process could include the following elements:
 An automatic stay of 45 or 60 days on commencing the proceeding; with the ability of the proposal
trustee to extend the stay period for an additional period if notice has been given to creditors and
there is no objection. Objections would be dealt with by the court.
 The MSE proposal process should be available to sole proprietors, whether or not incorporated,
micro and small businesses. Consideration should be given to extending the streamlined process
to medium enterprises, and if so, to the conditions under which such a streamlined process would
be available.
 Access to a MSE proposal process could be defined by a combination of numbers of employees
and a cap of liabilities, the latter being much higher than the current limit under Division II of the
BIA.
 Authority should be vested in the trustee to undertake specified tasks in order to facilitate
agreement between the debtor and creditors of proposals, eliminating the requirement to seek
supplemental orders from the court on appointment.
 The ability to make a proposal to creditors without the need to hold a meeting of creditors, unless
a specified percentage of creditors, such as 25%, request it.
 Proposals in a streamlined process should provide for at least the liquidation value of creditors’
claims in the proposal.
 If, after a specified period, creditors have expressed support for the proposal in terms of a
specified number of creditors holding a specified percentage of the debt, the proposal should be
deemed approved, without having to seek court approval. Objections can be dealt with by the
court.
 Government could consider making the threshold for deemed approval of a MSE proposal a
simple majority of creditors in both number and value of the claims.
 There should be time limits placed on Canada Revenue Agency’s time to respond to the proposed
proposal, after which it is deemed to have approved the proposal.
 The proposal process would be subject to a six-month limit in the normal case, but the court
should be authorized to extend the six-month limit for MSE and for all types of proposals under
the BIA in circumstances that the court considers appropriate.
 There should be a streamlined process to cure a temporary default in the terms of a MSE proposal,
including deeming it cured where creditors receive notice and do not object.
3. Modernize the notice provisions under the BIA, including allowing for electronic notice.
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4. Create a simplified standard form claims process that can be expedited where there is no dispute in
the amounts owed to creditors.
5. Modernize voting processes under the BIA, including use of new technologies to allow for electronic
voting by creditors.
6. The current cap on liabilities for access to Division II proposals should be raised considerably if there
is not a new proposal process for MSE insolvency. Even if there is a new MSE process, consider raising
the cap or exempting equipment used in trade or professional practice from the cap, so that
individuals with a higher level of debt are not forced into the administratively more costly Division I
proposal process.
7. Expand the current “tools of the trade” exemption to incorporated sole proprietorships and micro
businesses.
8. Consider raising the exemption amount to file GST/HST to 50,000 CAD or 60,000 CAD from the current
30,000 CAD that has been in place since the 1980s.
9. Consider amending the time period in which Crown claims must be paid under a proposal for MSE,
allowing one year for payment, essentially a form of interim financing by the Crown, with the
requirement of monthly payments of arrears owing and maintaining current payments.
10. There should be a review of how trustees are compensated for their professional services, including
consideration of a fixed tariff for the MSE proposal process; a streamlining of the interim and final
payment process for other insolvency proceedings; and consideration of a fixed amount of
administration fees to be allowed a higher priority such that the BIA can be accessible.
11. Increase funding for and availability of education and skills building for individuals commencing new
businesses.
12. Provide an expense within the new MSE proposal process for counselling on debt management, and
increase the fees for counselling under Division II to allow for meaningful education.
13. Work with the trade union, employer and trustee community to revamp the claims process under the
Wage Earner Protection Program to make it work in the best interests of the employees for whom it
was designed.
14. Undertake research into whether the banks are using the BIA receivership provisions appropriately,
and how the legislation could be amended to ensure greater fairness and transparency for all
creditors. Such research might look at whether there could be a mechanism for a secured lender to
have a licensed trustee do a quick “look-see” assessment of the finances, before commencing a
receivership or proposal proceeding, to determine the most appropriate route.
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15. The OSB should work with the stakeholder community and insolvency professionals to revise its forms
and data collection to better capture the reasons for insolvency, the outcomes of proposals versus
bankruptcy in terms of returns to creditors, and the support of viable businesses going forward.
In summary, while the provisions of the BIA may be largely effective for medium and larger enterprises,
there needs to be a mechanism that allows for a more streamlined and accessible process to deal with
the financial distress of micro and small businesses without the loss of safeguards for creditors, including
employees.
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Appendix 1
Survey of Trustees Regarding Treatment of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (“MSME”) in Insolvency
Name (no trustee will be individually quoted in the survey results) ____________________
Region (Province/Territory) ______________________
Percentage of your professional practice that is MSME insolvency, as per Industry Canada’s definition of
less than 500 employees? ______________
Of that number, what percentage are: Sole proprietors? ______
Micro (1-4 employees)? ______
Small (5-99 employees)? ______ Smaller medium (100 to 250 employees)? ______ and Medium
Enterprises (251-500 employees)? ______
Questions for Survey
1

Do you believe the statutory provisions for proposals under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) could
be enhanced to improve effectiveness and timeliness?
a. If yes, please list three ways in which the process could be made more efficient.
b. Do you believe the statutory provisions for proposals could be enhanced to make the process
less costly; and If yes, how?

2

If there was to be a more streamlined proposal process for MSME, what elements should it contain?
a. Access to the streamlined process by cap on amount of liabilities? If so, what amount?
b. A deemed approval process, absent a percentage of creditor opposition?
c. Less court/registrar involvement?
d. More clarity in the distinction between consumer bankruptcy and sole proprietor bankruptcy?
e. Other?

3.

Should a proposal specify how the reasons for the insolvency of the business are being addressed in the
proposal?

4.

Should there be a source of funding available, such as a program to provide temporary loans or loan
guarantees to MSME that address their financial difficulties until the enterprise can again access other
sources of capital?

5.

It has been suggested that the maximum six months afforded by the BIA to devise a proposal is a barrier to
filing.
a. Do you agree?
b. Should there be a discretion by the court to extend the time limit, and if so, in what circumstances
or on what conditions?

6.

Would mediation assist in better identifying whether or not and how a MSME business could be
rehabilitated?

7.

What problems, if any, are there with the administrative and payment structure under the BIA and should
there be a different mechanism for assessing fees under the BIA rather than to wait until the end of the
process?

8.

Do you have other views as to how to improve the treatment of insolvent MSME under Canadian law?

9.

Do you believe that the effectiveness of the Wage Earner Protection Program Act (WEPPA) would be
enhanced by modifying the involvement of the insolvency professionals in the administration of the
program?
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a.

If so, which of the following tasks do you believe should be performed by the trustee/receiver
(“T/R”); and which should be performed by the employees (“E”) and by Service Canada (“SC”)
without involvement of the trustee/receiver? (circle answers)
i. Notifying the employees of the existence of the program T/R SC
ii. Providing employees with an estimate of their claim based on the employer’s records T/R
SC
iii. Computing the claim amount T/R
E
SC
iv. Investigating the records of the employer to assess the amount due to the individual
employees T/R
E
SC
v. Advising the Wage Earner Protection Program of the amount due to the individual
employees T/R
E
SC
vi. Reporting on claims filed T/R
E
SC
vii. Filing claims T/R
E
SC
viii. Verifying claims T/R
E
SC
ix. Administering payments to employees T/R SC
x. Ensuring that a claim has been filed against the estate for the salary claim T/R E SC

10. There is colloquial evidence that issues arise with Canada Revenue Agency with respect to BIA proposals or
bankruptcies of MSME, which hinder the basic objectives of the legislation relating to rehabilitation, fresh
start and promoting restructuring over liquidation. Please rank the following issues by order of importance,
or mark not applicable (“N/A”) if you consider it not a problem.
a. Systematic “no” vote on proposals
b. Withholding of refunds until the proposal is fully performed
c. Assessments that are deemed valid
d. Set-off of pre and post government claims
e. Requirement to recognize a treatment similar to s. 60(1.1) BIA in consumer proposals
f. Claim that the deemed trust applies to property acquired after the date of bankruptcy
g. Other (please specify)
Thank you very much for assisting in this survey. We are also interested in speaking with some loans officers dealing
with MSME insolvency. If you can assist with a name and contact information, it would be greatly appreciated.
____________________
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